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This research answers the following questions about training exercises at the 
Army's National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California: "Which company team 
was the most survivable in the task force," and "What did that company team do 
differently to become the most survivable?" The research examines data collected over 
four month-long brigade training exercises at the NTC, including analysis of 88 company 
team battles. The measure of effectiveness (MOE) is the average system survival time for 
each company team for each battle. The company team that achieves the highest MOE 
score for a battle is considered the most survivable company team. The MOE is scaled for 
comparisons over the course of many battles. The MOE is then used as the dependent 
variable for a series of separate analyses of the data, which answer the second question. 
These analyses use a collection of 20 independent variables and six research questions to 
differentiate between more and less survivable company teams. The conclusions are that 
company teams whose leadership survives longer, who have a higher proportion of tanks, 
and who perform security operations better are more survivable. The research further 
recommends that the NTC's data collection efforts be automated and standardized among 
the collection teams. 
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This research answers the questions about training exercises at the Army's 
National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California: "Which company team was the 
most survivable in the task force," and "What did that company team do differently to 
become the most survivable?" For each task force battle, the relative survivability of each 
company team is compared to the other company teams within the task force. It also 
examines each company team's performance in a variety of tasks from the planning, 
preparation, and execution phases of the operation. 
The research examines data collected over four month-long brigade training 
exercises at the NTC, including analysis of 88 company team battles. All of the selected 
battles were of the force-on-force variety and used the Multiple Integrated Laser 
Engagement System (MILES) - no live fire battles were considered. 
To answer the first question (above), the measure of effectiveness (MOE) is the 
average system survival time for each company team for a given battle. The company 
team that achieves the highest MOE score for that battle is considered the most survivable 
company team. The MOE is scaled for comparisons over the course of many battles. The 
MOE is then used as the dependent variable for a series of separate analyses of the data, 
which answer the second question. These analyses use a collection of 20 independent 
variables over the three phases of an operation and six research questions to differentiate 
between more and less survivable company teams. 
The conclusions are that company teams whose leadership survives longer, who 
have a higher proportion of tanks, and who perform security operations better are more 
survivable. The research also shows significant relationships between survivability and 
performance of combat service support operations, boresight operations, actions on 
contact, the effect of enemy engagement areas, and the proportion of losses from indirect 
fire. The research further recommends that the NTC's data collection efforts be 
automated to allow for analysis of lethality. The NTC must also standardize the collection 
of subjective data to ensure that all collection teams gather data on the same items and 
use the same evaluation scale. This will enable the NTC to maintain data "on-the-shelf' 





The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, performs one of the 
most important training missions in the United States Army - that of preparing battalion 
task forces and brigade staffs for combat. The objectives of training at the NTC are to 
increase unit readiness, train leaders, embed doctrine throughout the Army, provide 
feedback to the Army, and provide a data source for lessons learned [Ref. 1]. The NTC 
provides a unique opportunity to assess training proficiency and provide feedback to the 
training units. Its large maneuver training areas and world class opposing force (OPFOR) 
allow for full-scale battalion and brigade force-on-force operations. During the past 16 
years, the Army has added a computer-driven, live-fire complex with sophisticated 
targetry and a state-of-the-art instrumentation system. 
Each year, twelve brigades from around the Continental United States (CONUS) 
go to the NTC for 24-day rotations during which they are thoroughly trained and assessed. 
Each of these brigades (called the BLUEFOR) brings 3500 to 5000 soldiers, including its 
infantry, armor, artillery, air defense, and aviation assets, as well as its staffs and its 
combat support and combat service support units. These units provide communications, 
engineers, intelligence, maintenance, chemical protection, etc. The brigades treat their 
rotations and conduct their missions as if they are in a combat zone from start to finish. 
They treat their arrival at Fort Irwin as if they were entering a hostile area of operations. 
Their first battle is a movement to contact (MTC) to locate the enemy and develop the 
conflict. From there they fight a series of offensive and defensive operations against the 
OPFOR, culminating in four days of live fire operations against computer-driven plywood 
targets. Following the battles, they repair and return the equipment they used during the 
rotation for the next unit to arrive, which replaces them in the combat zone. 
B. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
The Army's principal doctrinal manual, FM 100-5 Operations, states that 
"commanders seek to apply overwhelming combat power to achieve victory at minimal 
cost." To do so, they must combine "the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection and 
leadership" [Ref. 2]. This research focuses on one aspect of force protection - company 
team survivability - and how the other elements of combat power impact on survivability. 
The questions that this research attempts to answer is, "Which company team was the 
most survivable within its task force?" and, "What did that company team do to become 
the most survivable?" 
Currently, those questions are not directly answered and the NTC makes no 
apologies for that. The Observer Controllers' (OICs) principal mission is to train and 
provide feedback to the training units. They do not keep score of wins and losses. In fact, 
they do not even declare winners or losers after battles. Instead, the OICs focus on 
evaluating the tasks the units perform during the battle (i.e., performance of 
reconnaissance, use of indirect fire, preparation of a battle position, etc.). The OICs also 
provide training on how to improve task performance through a series of after action 
reviews (AARs). A brigade can expect to receive 600 AARs at all levels during their 
rotation. Each task force also receives a Take Home Package (THP), which is a 
consolidation of all battles and lessons learned for the task force from the entire rotation. 
The questions of which company team is the most survivable in the task force, and 
what makes that company team the most survivable, then remain. 
C. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This will answer the first question (above) by identifying a Measure of 
Effectiveness (MOE) that quantifies the relative success (in terms of survivability) of the 
company teams in relation to each other. With that complete, the most survivable 
company team (or teams) from the task force will be easily identifiable following any 
battle. The tool to identify that company team must be easily used by the Tactical Analysis 
Facility (T AF) analysts who track the battles for the OIC teams and it must not place 
additional workload burden on those analysts. Any additional workload might cause their 
other analysis tasks to suffer. 
The answer to the second question will come in the form of models of the data 
observed. Using the objective data from the TAF analysts and the subjective data from the 
O/Cs, the models will show trends that allow predictions of which company team will be 
the most survivable in a task force battle. Given that, those trends could be disseminated 
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to the force to allow units to improve their training by focusing on those areas that are 
most likely to lead to better survivability. 
D. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The next chapter of this thesis gives a brief overview of NTC operations and 
explains how data are gathered. Chapter III details the selection of the MOE that will 
answer the question, "Which company team was the most survivable in the task force?" It 
will also show a detailed description of a battle from the NTC, and how the MOE is used 
to answer the question for that battle. Chapter IV explains the development and selection 
of models that answer the question, "What did that company team do to become the most 
survivable?" as well as the research questions stated in Chapter II. It examines all the 
available indicators and then reduces the model to provide a usable, accurate predictor to 




A. NTC OPERATIONS 
To accomplish its critical mission of preparing battalion task forces and brigade 
staffs for combat, the National Training Center (NTC) is organized into three primary 
components: the training unit (BLUEFOR), the opposing force (OPFOR), and Operations 
Group. 
Each month, a new BLUEFOR unit arrives at the NTC from somewhere in the 
Continental United States (CONUS). A brigade-sized unit comes with all the assets it 
would take to war. Typically, that includes two or three maneuver task forces, an artillery 
battalion, a forward support battalion, an engineer battalion, an air defense battery, a 
chemical platoon, a military police platoon, a signal platoon, and a military intelligence 
platoon. Often, the brigade also brings up to a battalion of aviation assets that vary from 
attack and observation helicopters to utility helicopters that will provide lift for infantry, 
reconnaissance, or materiel assets. Usually, the brigade receives some close air support 
from the Air Force as well. Each maneuver task force is made up of three to five infantry 
and/or armor companies and a headquarters company. The infantry companies are 
typically equipped with 14 M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) and the armor 
companies will typically have 14 MIAI Abrams Main Battle Tanks. Often, these 
companies will task organize for particular missions by "trading" or "loaning" platoons to 
provide a mix of armor and infantry where needed. 
The BLUEFOR will train at the NTC for a 24-day period. During the first five 
days, they will train as if they are first entering a combat zone. They will use this time to 
draw their equipment just as if they were drawing it from one of the many staging areas 
around the globe. They will also conduct their preliminary reconnaissance of the area of 
operations (AO). On the sixth day, the BLUEFOR will depart the "drawyard" and enter 
the AO. Their first mission will be a movement to contact (MTC) so that they can gain 
contact with the OPFOR and develop the conflict. Over the next eight days, the 
BLUEFOR will conduct a series of offensive and defensive operations against the OPFOR 
throughout the expansive training area on the Fort Irwin reservation. Following the force-
on-force portion of the training, the BLUEFOR will fight a four day series of live-fire 
5 
battles against computer activated plywood targets. This adds to the realism of the training 
as units fire live ammunition to include small arms, tank rounds, anti-tank missiles, 
mortars, artillery, rockets, demolitions, etc., during both day and night operations. 
Following the live-fire operations, the unit departs the AO and spends four to six days 
cleaning and repairing the equipment for the next unit that will come to the NTC to train. 
The OPFOR, also known as the 11 th Armored Cavalry Regiment, is a permanent 
force at the NTC. The Regiment provides the OPFOR for every unit that comes to the 
NTC to train. Consequently, they are extremely proficient at the business of land combat 
and they know the terrain of the NTC very well. The mission of the OPFOR is to provide 
a tough, realistic enemy for the training unit. The OPFOR is equipped with both authentic 
and modified vehicles that replicate the tanks, personnel carriers, and reconnaissance 
vehicles that are most common in potentially adversarial countries. They fight using the 
tactics of those countries as well. 
Operations Group conducts a myriad of tasks to ensure that the training is as 
realistic and demanding as possible, and that the BLUEFOR departs the NTC as well 
trained as possible. Operations Group provides the higher headquarters for the BLUEFOR 
brigades so they can give them realistic missions and train the brigades' staffs. It also 
provides each training unit from brigade level down to platoon level, as well as all staff 
sections, with Observer/Controllers (O/C) and conducts the After Action Reviews (AAR). 
Among other duties, Operations Group handles the complex instrumentation system of the 
NTC that allows for realistic training and effective data gathering, replicates the media on 
the battlefield, and controls the battle by "refereeing" to ensure realistic training. 
B. DATA GATHERING 
The most significant contributor to the realism of the force-on-force portion of the 
training is the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) and the Simulated 
Area Weapons Effects (SA WE) system that supports it. Simply put, MILES is a laser tag 
system. Each weapon in the BLUEFOR and OPFOR is equipped with a MILES 
transmitter. When a soldier pulls a trigger, the weapon gives off a signature similar to the 
firing of a real round of ammunition; however, a laser beam is emitted instead of a bullet 
or missile. Each soldier and vehicle in the training area is fitted with a laser receiver to 
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allow the soldier or vehicle to be "hit" by the laser beam. Each Mll..,ES transmitter is 
coded by the type of ammunition it is replicating, as is each Mll..,ES receiver, to further 
ensure realistic training. Thus, when an Ml tank from the BLUEFOR shoots at an enemy 
T -80 tank from the OPFOR, the Mll..,ES system will determine if the round missed the 
target, nearly missed the target, or hit the target; and, if it hit the target, it will assess the 
appropriate amount of damage. The tank crew that was hit will receive a variety of 
indicators to alert them to the situation. Their radio will not work, except to tell them the 
extent of the damage. Also a yellow "whoopee" light will flash, so that anyone who could 
see the damaged vehicle will know that it was hit. The SA WE portion of the system 
replicates the impact of artillery and mines in much the way Mll..,ES does for direct fire 
engagements. 
Virtually every event that occurs in the NTC's training area is observed from the 
T AF and recorded in the NTC's database. The events include any vehicle movement, any 
movement by a team of dismounted soldiers, any firing of weapons from the Mll..,ES 
system, any target effects from direct fire, indirect fire, mines, etc. All of the data are 
available for AARs and for trend analysis. 
The same events that go into the database go directly to each task force T AF. The 
T AFs get a digital, live, overhead view of each battle as it progresses. It sees where every 
element is all the time, the status of those elements (alive, dead, degraded), and can 
observe all direct and indirect fire engagements. The T AF uses this information to assist 
the O/Cs in AAR preparation and in preparing the unit's Take Home Package (THP). 
Also, the T AF collects a variety of subjective observations from the O/Cs to assist 
in the analysis and contribute to the AARs and THPs. These observations provide insight 
about each company team's performance during the planning, preparation, and execution 
portions ot each battle. The specifics of these observations will be discussed later in detail. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The feedback from the O/Cs to the training units occurs primarily during the 
AARs. The focus of each AAR is on the critical tasks conducted during the operation in 
support of the unit's mission and the commander's intent for the operation. They do not 
typically address survivability as a separate issue. As mentioned earlier, survivability is 
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synonymous with protection, which is one of the four elements of combat power (along 
with maneuver, firepower, and leadership). The Army Research Institute conducts 
frequent studies to analyze various devices that are designed to increase survivability of 
both individual systems as well as units. This research will examine actions during the 
course of an operation that reflect on company team survivability. 
Knowing the answers to those questions would allow for two significant events. 
First, the OICs could use that information immediately following a battle to improve the 
feedback in the AARs. Units who suffer many losses can see what other, more survivable, 
units have done differently and they can make adjustments starting with the very next 
mission. Second, the Army could disseminate to the force the common traits of the 
company teams that have proven to be the most survivable in their task forces. Once 
identified, those traits could be trained at home stations for the general improvement of 
units throughout the Army. 
This research will attempt to answer several questions concerning company team 
survivability in order to determine what makes some company teams more survivable than 
others, and more importantly, what can company teams do to become more survivable? 
These questions are as follows: 
1. In each of the three phases of an operation - planning, preparation, and execution -
what tasks, when performed to standard, are most indicative of a company team 
that is more survivable that others? 
2. In which of the three phases is successful task performance most indicative of a 
more survivable company team? 
3. All things taken equally, which potential indicators offer the best predictions of 
how survivable company teams will be? 
4. Which indicators, when examined individually, differ significantly between more 
and less survivable company teams? 
5. Does task organization affect company team survivability? 
6. Does the type of mission cause different indicators to become more indicative of 
the level of company team survivability? 
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D. PREVIOUS THESES AT THE NTC 
This is the fourth thesis from the Naval Postgraduate School written for the NTC 
in support of its mission to train battalion task forces and brigade staffs. The first three 
provided tools to improve the quality of data and data encapsulation for future analysis. 
They gave tools to the OICs that, once implemented, would enable them to give improved 
feedback to the training units. This thesis is intended to put some of that previous work 
into use and bring the analysis work back to the training units. 
CPT Kirk Benson's thesis [Ref. 3] modeled the data encapsulation and 
communications network for the NTC to allow the NTC to manipulate its technology to 
accomplish certain goals. CPT Dana Goulette's thesis [Ref. 4] provided a means for 
standardized measurement of the subjective data from the battles. CPT Stanley Olenginski 
and CPT Alan Seise's joint thesis [Ref. 5] provided a standardized, multimedia CD-ROM 
take home package for T AF analysts to compile and issue to training units as they depart 
the NTC to return to their home station. Those theses have accomplished their purposes by 
providing effective tools to the NTC. This thesis will put those tools into use. 
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III. SELECTION OF MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
To answer the question, "Which company team was the most survivable in the task 
force?" we need an appropriate measure of effectiveness (MOE). The principle issues 
when answering such a question are: 
Which systems survived the battle? 
How long did the systems that were lost in the battle survive? 
If we know how long a unit kept its systems alive during the battle, we can assess its 
relative survivability. The company teams that keep their systems in the fight longer 
typically bring their task force the most maneuver and firepower assets through the course 
of the battle. In short, if we can answer those two questions, we can determine the most 
survivable company team in the task force. 
This research only considers tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) as the 
systems. Armor and mechanized company teams also typically have an indirect fire 
support vehicle (FIST-V), a field ambulance, a heavy recovery vehicle, a maintenance 
vehicle, and, frequently, air defense and engineer assets. Although these systems are 
important to a company team's survivability, the reasons for their survival are more open 
to speculation and circumstance. For example, the fire support team that is attached to the 
company might have responsibility for observing certain indirect fire targets. If the 
company team reacts to a contingency away from the targets, the fire support team might 
separate and act independently for a time or attach itself to another unit. Similar 
circumstances govern the proximity of the other assets to the company team. 
A more significant system that has been left out is the dismounted infantry. 
Dismounted infantry operate quite differently from their mounted counterparts. 
Frequently, they become casualties while still mounted in their Bradleys. They are often 
assigned missions separate from their company's mission. An analysis that includes 
dismounted infantry is certainly relevant, but beyond the scope of this research. Also, any 
analysis of dismounted infantry survival would be better suited for the Joint Readiness 
Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Polk, Louisiana. (The JRTC is the dismounted equivalent of 
the NTC.) 
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To capture this information (as well as information concerning volume offire), the 
O/Cs use Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) cards. On the BDA cards the company team 
O/Cs record the following for each weapon system: the type of weapon system, the 
bumper number, the MILES "kill code" which reveals what type of enemy caused the 
damage, and the time the weapon system was lost. Table 1 shows an example of a BDA 
card recorded for a battle that occurred in December 1997. 
Type BMPR# Kill Code Time 120mm 25mm TOW 
M1 A66 7 10:00 5 
M1 A65 7 11:15 3 
M1 All 16 
M1 A12 23 
M1 A13 UMCP 
M1 A14 22 
M1 A21 UMCP 
M1 A22 10 11:22 16 
M1 A23 ·10 11:25 10 
M1 A24 10 11:20 14 
M2 C11 UMCP 
M2 C12 10 9:45 
M2 C13 FASCAM 11:30 450 1 
M2 C14 FASCAM 11:35 507 3 
Table 1. Battle Damage Assessment Card for Alpha Team, TF 1-9 Cav (Mech) 
Notes: M2 = Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
MI = Abrams Main Battle Tank 
All = Alpha Company, 1 st Platoon, 1st Tank 
Kill Code 7 = enemy infantry fighting vehicle 
Kill Code 10 = enemy tank 
Other Kill Codes include FASCAM (a type of mine field), ARTY (artillery),' 
UMCP (for vehicles that did not participate in the battle because they were at the unit 
maintenance collection point), and many others 
120mm = number of tank rounds fired by that system (e.g., All fire 16 tank 
rounds in this battle) 
25mm = number of Bradley chain-gun rounds fired by that system (these are used 
against lightly armored systems) 
TOW = number of anti-tank missiles fired from the Bradley 
Figure 1. Explanation of terms on Battle Damage Assessment cards. 
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Using the information from the BDA card, we can first assess a survivability score 
for Alpha Team by summing the system-minutes that they provided to the task force 
during the battle. The reasoning behind this is simple. The longer that systems survive in 
the battle, the more survivable the company team is; and, therefore, the longer that system 
can contribute to its company team's mission. 
A system that enters the battle is given credit beginning from the time a task force 
becomes engaged with the enemy (not including task force reconnaissance and security 
forces) until the system is lost as a combat asset. This loss could be the result of direct fire, 
indirect fire, maintenance, or a minefield. A system that survives the entire battle is given 
credit until Change of Mission (COM) time. Change of Mission time is when the OICs 
determine that the battle has reached its conclusion and the fighting should stop so the 
units can focus on reconstitution oflosses and on conducting their AARs. 
For example, the above unit (from Table 1 and more detailed information in 
Appendix B) became engaged and suffered its first loss at 0930 hours and later received 
change of mission at 1145 hours. 2nd Tank Platoon, Alpha Team is scored as follows: 
A21 : no credit 
A22: 1122 - 0930 = 112 minutes 
A23: 1125 - 0930 = 115 minutes 
A24: 1120 - 0930 = 110 minutes 
Total: 337 minutes 
By adding the survival minutes for the remainder of Alpha Team (see Appendix A) we see 
that the team total would be 113 7 system-minutes (it receives no credit for the systems 
that were at the UMCP during the battle). 
The next step in MOE establishment is to account for different task organizations . 
of company teams. For instance, companies teams can operate purely as armor or as 
mechanized infantry; or, they can provide a mixture of the two systems. Also, company 
teams are subject to attachment and detachment of platoons that might give them the 
advantage of many more systems or the disadvantage of operating with relatively few 
systems. To account for this, the MOE will scale the total system-minutes by dividing by 
the number of systems in the company team. Thus, the MOE will be the average number 
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of minutes survived for each system that was in the company team at the start of the 
battle. For the above example, Alpha Team's average survival minutes is 1137 system-
minutes / 11 systems = 103.4 minutes. Task organization will be addressed again in the 
discussion of indicators in Chapter IV. 
Further scaling is required to account for the "pace" of the battle. Some battles 
take a lot less time than others. Some battles have proportionately higher casualties than 
other battles. Without further scaling, a company team that has all fourteen systems 
survive a one hour battle may appear to be less survivable than a unit that suffers many 
losses over the course of a ten hour battle. Since the MOE must reflect which company 
team is the most survivable in its task force during a given battle, regardless of the pace or 
lethality, the company team with the highest average survival minutes per system within its 
task force will receive an MOE score of 1.00 for that battle. The other company teams will 
receive an adjusted MOE score to be scaled off that most survivable company team. For 







71. 5 minutes 
114.7 minutes 
43.3 minutes 
Since Bravo Mech was the most survivable company team in the task force for this battle, 
the MOE scores are as follows: 
Alpha Tank: 0.90 
Bravo Tank: 0.62 
Bravo Mech: 1. 00 
Charlie Mech: 0.37 
Thus, we can easily compute which company team in a task force is the most 
survivable using the O/C's Battle Damage Assessment cards. The computed scores can 
then be analyzed to determine if certain aspects of that company team's performance are 
indicative of how survivable the company team will be. 
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For the TAP analysts to use their BDA cards to answer the question of which 
company team was the most survivable, they can use the Survivability Spreadsheet. At the 
completion of a battle, each of the company team TAP analysts simply inputs the relevant 
information for his company team. At the bottom of the page, the Survivability 
Spreadsheet shows which company team had the highest average system survivability for 
that battle. Appendix B shows a blank Survivability Spreadsheet and one from a battle 
from the December 1997 rotation at the me. 
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Iv. DATA ANALYSIS I REGRESSION MODEL 
A. POTENTIAL INDICATORS 
The indicators that will likely show why some company teams are more survivable 
than others can be broken down into categories representing the planning, preparation, 
and execution phases of the operations, as well as some indicators that are common 
throughout the phases. Care was given in selection of the indicators to ensure that 
gathering data for this research did not make any negative impact on the O/Cs or the 
training units. The indicators discussed in this chapter are routinely evaluated at the NTe 
by all company team O/Cs. 
During the planning phase, the O/Cs evaluate how well a company team does in 
execution of the Warning Order (WARNORD), dissemination of the operational graphics, 
preparation and issuance of the Operations Order (OPORD), timeline utilization, direct 
fire planning, and risk assessment. All of these areas except timeline utilization are 
subjectively evaluated by the O/Cs on a lito standard" I "not to standard II basis. All of the 
O/Cs are subject matter experts in company team operations and have company command 
experience. The twelve company team primary O/Cs are supervised by three task force 
O/Cs who are former battalion commanders. The company team O/Cs compare notes and 
strive for standardization among themselves on each task. For the subjectively evaluated 
indicators, this simple scale is probably as acceptable a measure of performance on the 
tasks as is available anywhere. 
The W ARNORD is a brief order that alerts the unit that an operation is upcoming. 
It gives the unit some direction and priorities of work in preparation for the mission while 
the commander makes his tentative plan, conducts reconnaissance, and completes the 
OPORD. It has no required format, but typically includes the following [Ref 6]: 
1. Nature (attack, defend, movement to contact, etc.) and time of mission. 
2. Earliest time of next movement. 
3. Tasks to be accomplished prior to the issue of the OPORD. 
4. Time, place, and attendees for the OPORD. 
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The operational graphics include the maneuver graphics, fire support graphics, 
intelligence graphics, and combat service support graphics. They come in the form of 
transparent overlays that, when affixed to a map of the area of operations, represent all 
relevant operational locations with the appropriate symbols. These symbols include check 
points and phase lines that help units coordinate their movements, direct fire and indirect 
fire target reference points, templated and actual locations of enemy units, locations of 
obstacles, ambulance exchange points, chemical decontamination sites, and many other 
items. Each of these are issued to the company team commander when he receives the 
task force operations order. The company team must effectively combine and disseminate 
the graphics so that each system can operate independently and properly communicate 
during the operation. 
The OPORD is a much more structured document than the W ARNORD. At the 
company team level at the NTC, commanders typically spend 45 to 60 minutes just to 
issue their orders to their subordinate leaders. The OPORD has five paragraphs, each with 




4. Service Support 
5. Command and Signal 
The preparation and issuance of OPORDS is taught to commanders repeatedly during pre-
commissioning education, at officer basic courses, and, most thoroughly, at officer 
advanced courses, which commanders .generally attend one to three years prior to their 
command tour. 
The direct fire plan is part of the Execution paragraph of the OPORD. The OICs 
evaluate this task separately from the OPORD itself (to be discussed further in the Data 
Collection section). It focuses on how the company team will use its direct fire assets 
(tanks, TOWs, Bradley chain guns, and machine guns) to kill the enemy and destroy his 
equipment. It includes how the commander plans to distribute fires, at what ranges he 
wants to use which systems, what types of enemy systems he prioritizes as targets for each 
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of his systems, and how he plans to control direct fire using fire control measures such as 
engagement areas, target reference points, and sectors of fire [Ref 6]. 
Risk assessment refers to how the company team examines the risks that they are 
taking in the operation and what they are doing to minimize those risks. "Field Marshal 
Erwin Rommel defined risk as a chance you take; if it fails, you can recover. A gamble is a 
chance taken; ifit fails, recovery is impossible" [Ref 2]. Specifically, the O/Cs evaluate 
how well company teams identify, assess, and implement controls for hazards such as 
potential fratricide situations, security issues, etc. They also examine how well company 
teams account for the effects of weather, sleep deprivation, training and experience on 
task performance. 
Timeline utilization refers to what portion of the available planning and preparation 
time the company team commander took in preparation and issuance of the OPORD. As 
he works through the Troop Leading Procedures, he strives to prepare the best possible 
plan for how his company team will fight while still allowing his subordinates to have 
enough time after he issues the plan for them to prepare for the battle. These data are 
recorded in two ways. First, they are recorded as a percentage of the available time the 
company team commanders use from when they receive their task force OPORDs until the 
battles begin. The standard is 33 percent - known as the "one-third I two-third rule". 
Commanders attempt to issue their OPORDs close to 33 percent of the way through their 
available timeline. Doing so should give commanders enough time to prepare effective 
orders while maximizing the time for their company teams to execute the tasks that occur 
in the preparation phase of operations. The timeline utilization can also be described by a 
Boolean variable with a "I" corresponding to a company team whose proportion of time 
used was less than or equal to 33 percent and a "0" otherwise. 
During the preparation phase, the O/Cs examine how well company teams execute 
local security operations, combat service support operations, rehearsals, boresighting, pre-
combat inspections, and maintenance. All of these except maintenance are evaluated on 
the same subjective scale ("to standard" or "not to standard") as in the planning phase. 
Security is a principle of war, defined as not permitting "the enemy to acquire 
unexpected advantage" and it "results from measures taken by a commander to protect his 
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forces" [Ref 2]. OICs evaluate how well company teams conduct local security by 
observing their security posture (e.g., one man manning a machine gun from every tank 
and IFV), their conduct of security patrols, their . emplacement and conduct of observation 
posts, their use of chemical defense alarms, etc. Sometimes units lose systems prior to the 
beginning of a battle because of poor security operations. We could reasonably expect a 
unit that does a better job of conducting security operations to be more survivable than a 
unit that does a poor job. 
Combat service support operations are those that provide the means for a company 
team to sustain its combat operations throughout a campaign. They give "the assistance 
provided to sustain combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics" 
[Ref 7]. Specifically, the OICs evaluate how well companies conduct supply, maintenance 
and medical operations. Supply operations include daily resupply of food and water, mail, 
necessary petroleum products to include fuel, acquisition of supplies to include spare 
parts, batteries for night vision devices, and replacement of broken tools. Maintenance 
operations focus on the crew of each system conducting preventive maintenance checks 
and services, crews and mechanics troubleshooting broken systems, mechanics ordering 
replacement parts and repairing broken systems, and effective evacuation of broken 
systems. Medical operations include "buddy aid", provided by the crewmembers, and the 
actions of the units' combat lifesavers (soldiers that have been trained in first aid and CPR) 
and the attached combat medics. 
Rehearsals are recorded as data in two ways: the O/C's subjective evaluation of the 
quality of the rehearsals conducted by the company team and the type of rehearsal that 
they conducted. The type of rehearsal that a company team conducts often depends on the 
tactical situation in terms of security and time available. Ideally, commanders want to 
conduct mounted rehearsals with their entire company teams. This is often impractical due 
to security concerns and conflicts with other preparation tasks. Other methods include 
mounted rehearsals with just key leaders, dismounted rehearsals, terrain model rehearsals, 
"FM" rehearsal (conducted on the radio), map rehearsals, and backbriefs. It seems logical 
that the more realistic the rehearsal and the higher the quality of the rehearsal, the more 
survivable the company team may be for the upcoming operation. 
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Boresighting is the process of aligning a weapon system with its sights. Unless a 
system is boresighted, the accuracy of the weapon's fire is impaired. Boresighting should 
be conducted frequently (two or three times daily) because weapons lose their boresight 
over time and as vehicles move and as weather conditions change. Also, due to parallax 
between the line of sight from the gunners' sights and the flight path of a round (or direct 
path of a MIT...ES laser beam), the leaders must take care to boresight at the appropriate 
range - the range at which they expect to do most of their firing. Weapons systems that 
are not properly boresighted will be unable to destroy enemy systems; thus, we expect 
company teams that boresight poorly will be less survivable than those that boresight well. 
Pre-combat inspections provide commanders and their subordinate leaders a 
chance to ensure that their unit is prepared for the upcoming mission. The items that are 
inspected vary from unit to unit and from mission to mission. Some units have 
standardized checklists to use as guides during these inspections. Some commanders state 
in their OPORDs the items they will inspect for that particular operation. In any event, a 
commander should take the opportunity to inspect those items within his company team 
that will give him an appraisal of his unit's readiness. Commanders will typically inspect 
maps to ensure that each tank and IFV has the maneuver graphics for the operation, the 
load plans to see that all necessary equipment within each system is properly stowed and 
readily available, the boresight of each system, and how well members of the tank and IFV 
crews understand the mission and the commander's intent for the operation. Commanders 
are taught to leave time after pre-combat inspections for their units to correct those items 
that did not meet his standards. 
In terms of maintenance, this research considers the percentage of systems that 
each company team has available for each operation. This is called the operational 
readiness rate (OR rate). Although we do not penalize a company team in the MOE score 
for having a system that is unavailable for combat, we should examine the loss of that 
system on the survivability of the unit as a whole. We would expect units that are able to 
bring all of their systems into the battle are able to fight as a complete, cohesive unit and 
should be more survivable. However, it is also true that large units provide better targets. 
It could be that there is a negative correlation between OR rate and survivability. For 
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purposes of this study, OR rate at LD time for offensive and defend time for defensive 
battles will be collected. Future studies may want to examine the many tasks that support 
the OR rate, s)lch as how well operator~ conduct preventive maintenance checks and 
services (PMCS), various ways that units organize their maintenance teams, how well they 
conduct recovery operations, and how quickly units are able to get repair parts. 
To evaluate the execution phase, this research focuses on actions on contact, 
volume of fire, what systems are lost to what type of enemy, combat losses ofleadership, 
and effects of enemy engagement areas. Other potential indicators, such as how well 
company te~ms communicate during the battle, their use of terrain, how well they 
maneuver, and their use of indirect fire are not currently evaluated at the company team 
level on a recurring, standardized basis and were, therefore, unavailable for this study. 
Actions on contact are battle drills company teams execute when they first make 
contact with an enemy element. Different O/C teams at the NTC evaluate actions on 
contact differently. Two of the O/C teams subjectively evaluate the company teams on a 
lito standard II I "not to standard" basis. The other team evaluates all the opportunities 
within each company team and reports a percentage of actions that were conducted to 
standard over the battle as a whole. That evaluation team then report that company teams 
were successful if they acted properly in at least half of their opportunities. For all three 
O/C teams, the evaluators expect the company teams and their platoons to conduct actions 
on contact in accordance with their doctrinal manuals. That is, when a unit makes contact 
with an enemy unit it should first return fire, deploy, and report. It should then develop the 
situation by fire and maneuver. Finally, it chooses a course of action, such as conducting a 
hasty attack, bypassing, conducting an ambush, or fixing the enemy while the task force 
bypasses or assists in destroying that enemy [Ref. 6]. 
Volume of fire refers to the amount of ammunition the company team expends 
during the battle. The data are recorded as percentages of the basic load of ammunition 
that the company teams expended during the battle. If a unit keeps up a heavy volume of 
fire it seems reasonable that the enemy would have difficulty killing them and, thus, the 
company team would become more survivable. Also, a heavy volume offire may cause a 
company team to become a more promising target for the enemy's direct and indirect fires. 
22 
In some cases, there could be a negative correlation between volume of fire and 
survivability. 
The MILES system provides data on the type of enemy that kills each system,· as 
shown in Table 1. This research attempts to determine ifthere is any correlation between 
survivability and the type of enemy that kills the company team. 
A company team has as its leaders a commander, executive officer, platoon 
leaders, and platoon sergeants that constitute the unit's leadership within a battle. (The 
First Sergeant, while an important leader within the company team, focuses on other 
events during battles and is not taken to be a factor in terms of system survivability. i 
Logically, as company teams lose these key individuals, we would expect the units' 
survivability to decrease. For purposes of this research, we will define a company team as 
havingjUllleadership, degraded leadership, or lost leadership. Lost leadership refers to 
company teams that are fighting without their commanders and with less than half of the 
subordinate leaders mentioned above. Degraded leadership refers to company teams that 
are fighting without their commanders or with less than half of the subordinate leaders 
mentioned above. Full leadership refers to company teams that have not suffered the 
losses ofleadership that would put them in either of the other categories. To analyze this 
indicator, we examine the prqportion of each battle that the company teams fight while in 
the above-described levels ofleadership. 
An engagement area is an area that a defending unit selects to destroy its enemies. 
A defending unit will typically use artillery, obstacles and deception to draw an enemy into 
its engagement area, and will then concentrate its direct fire assets toward killing the 
enemy there [Ref. 6]. In the execution phase, we would expect units that do the best job 
of avoiding and reacting to enemy engagement areas to be more survivable than others. 
Units that do not react well to enemy engagement areas typically lose a large portion of 
their systems in a short period of time. This research calculates the effects of engagement 
areas by dividing the duration of the highest concentration of a company team's losses by 
the duration of all of its losses. We use lower values for this ratio to signify units that 
suffered greater losses in engagement areas. The duration of the highest concentration of 
losses is the shortest time in which a company team suffered half of its losses. Logically, if 
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a company team was actually in an engagement area, it would suffer its losses more 
rapidly than when it was not in an engagement area. An example of the calculations from 
Alpha Team, TF 1-9 CAY (Appendix A) is as follows: 
1. Alpha Team lost eight systems in total during the battle. 
2. The shortest time span in which they lost four systems was from 1115 hours to 
1125 hours, or 10 minutes. 
3. They suffered their first loss at 0945 hours and their last loss at 1135 hours, 110 
minutes apart. 
4. The duration of highest concentration oflosses over the duration of all losses is the 
ratio: 10 minutes /110 minutes = 0.0909. 
In addition to the indicators from the planning, preparation and execution phases, 
there are indicators that will remain constant throughout the operation. The first indicator 
is the type of operation conducted - offensive or defensive. It is reasonable to surmise that 
different indicators may be relevant for the different types of operations. The second 
indicator is the type of mission assigned to the company team by the task force 
commander. One company team within a task force is always designated as the main 
effort. As such, it is often the company team that the task force commander perceives as 
the strongest. Because of being used as the main effort, it will likely be placed in a position 
to suffer greater losses than the supporting effort company teams. 
The effect of task organization on survivability is also considered. Tanks are 
designed to have greater survivability than IFV s, and we should account for that when 
analyzing survivability. We expect tank companies and tank heavy teams to have higher 
survivability rates than mechanized companies and mech heavy teams. Also, we should 
examine the effect of team size on survivability - do teams with more or less than the 
usual three platoons have different survivability levels? This research investigates this 
question. There are ten common task organizations for company teams. To gain the most 
infonnation from these task organizations, three aspects of each are considered: 
1. What is the primary system: Tank, IFV, or is the team Balanced? 
2. How big (relative to the nonnal three platoons) is the company team? 
3. Has the company team received attachments? 
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Table 2 shows.how each of the ten most common task organizations were assigned in 
terms of the questions above. 
Task Organization Primary System Size Attachments 
(Tank PIts., IFV PIts.) (Tank, IFV, Bal.) (Norm, Lg., Sm.) (pure, Att.) 
3,0 Tank Norm. Pure 
2,1 Tank Norm. Att. 
3,1 Tank Lg. Att. 
2,0 Tank Sm. Pure 
0,3 IFV Norm. Pure 
1,2 IFV Norm. Att. 
1,3 IFV Lg. Att. 
0,2 IFV Sm. Pure 
2,2 Bal. Lg. Att. 
1,1 Bal. Sm. Att. 
Table 2. Task Organizations and Categorical Indicators 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
Data were collected for this research from November 1997 to February 1998 and 
covered four active duty brigade rotations at the National Training Center. It observed 
seven task forces (four armored, three mechanized infantry) and 25 company teams (13 
- armored, 12 mechanized infantry) from three CONUS active duty installations as they 
conducted 28 task force and 88 company team battles. The three installations that were 
represented were Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Hood, Texas; and Fort Stewart, Georgia. The 
units did not include any from outside the Continental United States, did not include any 
divisional or regimental cavalry squadrons, did not include any light forces, and did not 
include any reserve component units. Any generalizations and conclusions that are drawn 
from this research can naturally be extended to other active duty forces; however, the 
same is probably not true for light, cavalry, and reserve component units. Light units 
operate in a vastly different way, conducting some different forms of maneuver in 
offensive operations as well as some different forms of the defense. As stated earlier, any 
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study of light forces is better conducted at the JRTC at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Cavalry units 
do not typically attack and defend, as armored and mechanized infantry task forces do. 
Instead, they screen, guard, and cover. Just as we would expect different indicators to be 
most significant for an armored or mechanized company team in offensive and defensive 
operations, we could expect different indicators to be most significant for the cavalry 
troops in their differing missions. Also, cavalry troops are organically structured with a 
complement of tanks and cavalry fighting vehicles (very similar to the infantry fighting 
vehicles). They do not suffer the oft-changing task organizations of the company teams. In 
the case of reserve component units, their vastly different mission essential task lists 
(METLs) and restricted training time cause them to have different priorities and training 
backgrounds than the active duty units. We would logically expect to find different 
answers to the research questions if we examined reserve component units. 
The climate for this research was typical desert winter conditions: warm in the 
daytime (high temperatures typically between 55 and 75 degrees Fahrenheit), cool at night 
(low temperatures from 20 to 40 degrees), occasional high winds (gusts up to 40 miles per 
hour), and little precipitation. The terrain at the NTC is open and mountainous. There is 
much open terrain with freedom to maneuver and conduct long range direct fire 
engagements, but there is also considerable terrain that is restricted to maneuver forces by 
a complicated wadi system and some terrain that is closed to maneuver by the mountains. 
Conclusions from this research can be equally applied to any weather conditions that are 
not unusually hostile and in other environments that allow weapons systems some freedom 
to maneuver and conduct long range engagements. The conclusions should not be 
considered viable for heavy task forces conducting operations in a jungle climate. 
The subjective data for the research come primarily from observations by the 
company team O/Cs, with assistance from their platoon DICs. For each operation, the 
DICs travel along side and within the company teams from the time they receive their task 
force operations order, through the company teams' planning, preparation, and execution 
of their missions, and ultimately into the consolidation and reorganization which occurs at 
the end of each mission. Approximately two hours following the end of each battle, the 
company team O/Cs conduct their AARs with the commanders and, usually, the other key 
26 
leaders within the company team. Typically, the company team O/Cs relay their 
observations to the task force O/Cs at two different times during the operation. First, at 
some time when each company team has completed the planning phase and is well into the 
preparation phase, the task force O/Cs will meet with all their company team O/Cs to hear 
their evaluations. This allows the task force O/Cs to ensure that the evaluations follow 
acceptable standards for each team. In other words, they ensure that those company teams 
that receive a "to standard" rating on a task actually met the standards and performed the 
task better than those that received a "not to standard" for the same task. The O/Cs meet 
again shortly after the execution phase for the same purpose. 
Once the task force and company team O/Cs have discussed each task evaluation, 
the evaluations are relayed to the Tactical Analysis Facility (TAP). At the TAP each 
company team has an integrator who collects the data for his company team. There is also 
a task force integrator who ensures valid and complete data collection across the task 
force. He further consolidates the data and makes task force AAR reports that show how 
w~ll each element of the task force performed during the planning, preparation and 
execution phases of the operation. 
The subjective data that are collected through the above methods are the 
following: 
• Warning Order 
• Graphics 
• Operations Order 
• Direct Fire Plan I Execution 
• Security Operations 
• Combat Service Support 
• Risk Assessment 
• Rehearsal Quality 
• Boresight 
• Pre-combat Inspection 
• Actions on Contact 
The objective data that are collected through the above methods follow: 
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• Timeline 
• Type of Rehearsal 
• Time of Loss for a System 
• Cause of Loss for a System 
• Volume of Fire 
• Effects of Engagement Areas 
• Loss of Leadership 
The O/Cs and the TAP integrators working together gather time and cause of loss 
for a system. When a system is lost during a battle, either the O/C knows about it when he 
sees the system's "whoopee" light flashing, the TAP integrator will notice the system's icon 
on his screen turn from blue to black or gray, or both. These two sources of information 
provide enough redundancy to ensure accurate data collection. They communicate to each 
other the time ofloss. Then the O/C inspects the "brain box" on the system's MILES to 
determine the cause of the loss. He relays this information to the TAP analyst. The O/C 
also inspects the brain box of all systems at the conclusion of the battle to determine how 
many rounds were fired. This is also relayed to the TAP for calculation of the volume of 
fire. 
The TAP analysts collect all of the above information in two places: the task force 
AAR reports and the company team battle damage assessment (BDA) reports. From the 
BDA reports we can also gather the task organization and operational readiness rate by 
observing how many platoons of each system type were assigned to each company team 
and what percentage of those systems actually started the battle. 
There are potential sources of error in the collection of these data. These stem 
from the typical causes of human error. Different O/Cs and integrators will perform 
differently in collection of the data. The three teams that ~ere used to gather these data 
collect and evaluate some tasks differently from each other. Some of the differences were 
mentioned in the discussion of indicators above. However,each potential indicator 
deserves a brief discussion of potential errors: 
• Warning Order and Graphics. One of the three task force O/Cteams does not 
specifically address W ARNORDs. However, the purpose of these two 
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indicators is to address how well company teams perform in the earliest stage 
of planning and its impact on survivability. Also, most company teams (78 
percent) evaluated by the other OIC team either met the standard on both tasks 
or failed to meet the standard on both. For this combined indicator, the 
company teams were evaluated as follows: from the O/C team that only 
evaluated graphics, company teams that met the standard were given a "1" and 
those that did not were given a "0"; from the O/C teams that evaluated both, 
company teams that met the standard on both were given a "1", those that met 
the standard on only one were given a "112", and the others were given a "0". 
The three task force O/Cs enforced standards. However, since this task often 
gets overlooked in favor of the OPORD during the planning phase, it is 
possible that O/Cs might give company teams the benefit of the doubt and 
report that they were "to standard" without 'having actually made an 
observation. 
• Operations Orders. These were evaluated subjectively by the O/Cs. Standards 
were enforced by the task force O/Cs who conducted detailed discussions with 
the assembled company team O/Cs. 
• Risk Assessment. These were evaluated subjectively by the O/Cs. Risk 
assessment has eight subordinate tasks that each of the O/C teams use to arrive 
at a single evaluation. The.task force O/Cs enforce the standards. However, 
like the WARNORD, risk assessment's repetitive nature might cause O/Cs to 
give units the benefit of the doubt once they meet the standard. 
• Timeline. These are objective data that are relayed from the O/Cs to the TAFs. 
The reported numbers are most assuredly accurate. With timeline percentages, 
however, the numbers do not always tell the whole story. For example, if the 
one-third I two-third rule recommends issuing an OPORD at 0300 hours, 
perhaps the commander is better advised to let his key leaders get some rest 
before issuing them an order to which they must pay very close attention. For 
the battles observed for this research, 97 percent had a recommended time of 
OPORD issue (by the one-third I two-third rule) during daylight hours. 
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• Direct Fire Plan I Execution. As explained earlier, the three teams evaluate this 
area differently. There is some potential for error because two teams focus 
their evaluation on the planning phase and the other focuses on the execution 
phase. Any conclusions drawn about this indicator must take that into 
consideration. 
• Security Operations. This is another subjectively evaluated indicator. Because 
security operations are broad in scope, including everything from how 
disciplined the unit is while maintaining night watches to their placement of 
chemical alarms to how vigorously they conduct reconnaissance and security 
patrols, the different ole teams may observe and focus on different aspects of 
security. Also, BLUEFOR units that come for training typically perform 
security tasks poorly during the first few days, and then show improvement as 
the rotation progresses. Once the unit improves, the O/Cs' attention may be 
more focused on other preparation tasks, which may causes inflated, or benefit 
of the doubt, evaluations for security operations later in a rotation. 
• Combat Service Support. Similar to security operations, this subjectively 
evaluated area tends to show improvement over the course of a rotation. The 
impact on unit survivability might be hidden by the fact the units generally do a 
poor job with CSS operations early in the rotation and better later. 
• Rehearsal Quality. Like the OPORD, the O/Cs monitor the rehearsals very 
closely. They view this task, along with boresighting, as the most important 
preparation phase task. There is no obvious source of error here; however, 
there is a great potential for interaction between rehearsal quality and rehearsal 
type. If the company team conducts a map rehearsal when there is obvious 
opportunity and potential benefit to have a mounted rehearsal, the OIC is likely 
to assess the rehearsal quality as "not to standard". This is not necessarily a 
reflection of how well the company team conducted the map rehearsal, but 
more a reflection of the lost opportunity to conduct a higher level of rehearsal. 
• Boresight. This task has potential for "benefit of the doubt" assessment during 
the middle battles of the rotation. The O/Cs are quite focused on this task 
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during the beginning of the rotation and during the live fire battles (which 
occur at the end of the rotation). However, once units show competence in the 
conduct of bore sighting their :MILES systems for the force-on-force battles, 
the Oles might not check it every time in favor of concentrating on other 
tasks. 
• Pre-Combat Inspection. This task is another that typically improves over the 
course of a rotation. Therefore, once the company team shows proficiency in 
the conduct of their PCls, the Oles might not actually evaluate this task every 
time, but instead rate them as "to standard". 
• Actions on Contact. As explained earlier, the three ole teams evaluate this 
area differently. Like the direct fire plan, this task also has potential for spill 
over between the planning and execution phases of the operation. Different 
OICs will evaluate this task during different phases. Any conclusions drawn 
about the impact of this task on survivability should take into consideration 
that some of the data are taken from different phases of the operation. When 
determining which indicators in the planning and execution phases have the 
strongest correlation with survivability, any conclusions about actions on 
contact must take this into account. 
• Rehearsal Type .. Different OIC teams categorize the types of rehearsals 
differently from each other. For purposes of this research, the ole 
categorizations have been assembled to represent mounted rehearsals, walk-
through rehearsals, "check-the-block-rehearsals" (which include map, brief-
back and FM rehearsals), and "none" (no rehearsal was conducted). This 
should allow for a simpler analysis, without considering the details of what 
proportion of the urilt participated in the rehearsal. Those concerns are 
impossible to adequately assess with the given data and, furtherm9re, the 
assessments should manifest themselves in the subjective assessment of the 
quality of the rehearsal. 
• Time of Loss for a System. Some company team TAF integrators simply do a 
better job of recording this information than others during the course of a 
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battle. There are several potential causes for this. Some TAF integrators are 
assigned additional units - such as the task force scout platoon - to keep track 
of as well, resulting in information overload during a fast paced battle. Also, 
time ofloss for each system was requested specifically for this research. Other 
projects, including the Advanced Warfighting Experiment have required these 
data for analysis. However, because this is not routinely gathered information, 
some (three of twelve) TAF integrators did an inconsistent job of collecting the 
information. Often, a missing time of loss entry was easily estimated - if a 
platoon lost two systems to artillery at 10:15 and they lost a third system to 
artillery at an unknown time, we can estimate that the system was lost in the 
same artillery barrage at 10: 15. The impact on such estimates is slight due to 
the scaling of the MOE. They are not likely to move a unit from the status of 
most survivable to a lower status, or vice versa. For battles in which a TAF 
integrator did such a poor job of recording times of loss that estimation was 
not possible, that company team was eliminated for consideration for that 
battle and the task force was considered to be one company team smaller. 
When this happened to an already small task force, the battle was removed 
from consideration. 
• Cause of Loss for a System. Some OICs report the :MILES kill code during the 
battles, while others report the specific type of system that caused the loss. 
There is some conflict between anti-tank missile kills and the identification of 
the system which launched the missile. For example, an AT-5 that is launched 
from a BMP2 gives a 07 kill code, while the same missile from a BRDM gives 
a 08 kill code. Further, BMPs have five different kill codes from their various 
weapons. Because of the higher prevalence ofBMPs over BRDMs on the 
battlefield, if the cause ofloss was in doubt between these two, the BMPs were 
given credit for the loss. Also, the entry for enemy air kills includes both fixed 
and rotary wing aircraft. Entries from many T AF integrators do not distinguish 
which type of aircraft caused the loss. To alleviate these errors and allow for 
more generalized answers to the research questions, this research groups the 
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causes of loss into four categories: direct fire, indirect fire, minefields, and 
maintenance. 
• It should be noted that for live-fire battles, both Time of Loss and Cause of 
Loss for systems are selected by the OICs and not by an enemy. Because this 
can be somewhat arbitrary, all data from live-fire battles were eliminated for 
purposes of this research. 
• Operational Readiness Rate. Most TAF integrators record maintenance losses 
during the battle as different from systems that never entered the battle because 
of maintenance. For the former, the OR rate is the most accurate. There is 
potential for error, however, when the records make it unclear whether a 
sy~tem entered the battle and later broke down or was not able to enter the 
battle. Cross-references with the task force reports usually clarify this; 
however, about 10 percent of the reports required an estimate of the OR rate 
for a particular company team. This estimate was typically in the neighborhood 
of 7 to 10 percent in magnitude. 
• Volume of Fire. The O/Cs and TAF integrators recorded these data faithfully 
and accurately. The potential for erroneous conclusions comes with the 
differing volumes of fire for different types of missions and different types of 
battles. Specifically, company teams fire more ammunition in defensive battles 
than when they attack because there are more enemy units to engage in 
defensive operations. Also, tanks typically fire more of their ammunition than 
IFV s. Any conclusions drawn about volume of fire must take into 
consideration mission type and task organization. 
• Effects of Engagement Areas. In theory, only an attacking unit will be subject 
to the effects of an enemy engagement area. This research pursues this analysis 
for both attacking and defending units, however, on the assumption that the 
principles will remain the same. In other words, attacking units who lose the 
bulk of their systems in a short span of time are considered to have been 
diminished by an enemy engagement area. The analysis shows that units should 
have modified their schemes of maneuver appropriately to counter the effects 
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of the engagement areas. Similarly, defending units that lose the bulk of their 
systems rapidly should have also modified their defensive schemes of maneuver 
to preserve their systems. That said, this research determines whether this 
indicator is significant in either offensive or defensive operations, or both. 
• Loss of Leadership. There are two obvious sources of error with this indicator. 
First, this research presumes that if a leader's system is unavailable for the 
battle, the leader has moved to his wing system. This is probably true for 
platoon leaders and platoon sergeants but is more questionable for 
commanders and executive officers. Commanders and executive officers do not 
have wingmen and will typically move to some designated system within the 
company team. Which systems the commander and executive officer move to 
vary from unit to unit and from battle to battle. This research assumes that 
commanders move to their executive officers' systems (which is probable) and 
that executive officers are not in the battles. An executive officer whose system 
is not available will probably move to one of the six wing systems in the 
company team. However, predicting which ofthe six systems is impossible. 
Second, this research presumes that once their systems die in battle, the key 
leaders are no longer available. Although this seems logical, it is not always 
true. Sometimes, a lost system is assessed a lesser amount of damage and the 
leader is allowed to jump to another system. Unfortunately, the frequency of 
this varies significantly among the OIC teams and no records of these 
occurrences are kept. Still, even when a key leader moves to a new system, he 
is generally out of the battle for some period of time (typically 15 to 60 
minutes) and his unit will feel the effects much as if he were permanently lost. 
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
To analyze the relationships between the various indicators and survivability, this 
research includes separate·analyses to answer each of the six research questions from 
Chapter ll. Several of the research questions are best answered by dividing the company 
teams into two categories - "more survivable" and "less survivable". All company teams 
with MOE> 0.65 are said to be more survivable; all company teams with MOE < 0.65 are 
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said to be less survivable. The break point of 0.65 was chosen for two reasons. First, this 
is the location of the largest break in the MOE scores for this data set. No company teams 
received MOE scores that were less than 0.67 and greater than 0.63. Also, it places only 
the lowest 23 of the 88 data points Gust over 25 percent) in the "less survivable" category. 
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Figure 2. Scatter plot of Scaled MOE. The dashed line represents the break between more 
and less survivable company teams at MOE = 0.65. 
Research Question 1: "In each of the three phases of an operation - planning, 
preparation, and execution - what tasks, when performed to standard, are most 
indicative of a company team that is more survivable than others?" 
For each phase we need to determine which indicator has the most significant 
relationship with survivability. To do so we use three analytical tools: regression trees, 
classification trees, and linear models - all of which are available in S-Plus. For each of 
these, the MOE developed in Chapter III (the scaled average of the time that each system 
in the company team survived the battle) is the dependent variable and the various 
indicators discussed earlier in this chapter are the independent variables. 
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S-Plus builds trees as follows: 
1. It starts at the root, which contains all the data. The tree in Figure 3, for 
example, shows the root at the top. In the node is the value "0.76", which is 
the mean MOE score for all of the data. The value below the node, 3.400, is 
the total deviance of the tree to that point. (Deviance is defined later in this 
section.) 
2. S-Plus then considers all the independent variables and all the potential splits to 
find the variable and split that will reduce the deviance the most. Continuing 
with Figure 3, note that S-Plus selected the independent variable "Timeline" 
and the split at 0.345. This means that all company teams with Timeline < 
0.345 are now grouped together in the node with value "0.66" - this is the 
mean MOE score for those units. The company teams with Timeline > 0.345 
are grouped in the node with value "0.85". Note that the sum of the two 
deviances (1.800 and 1.100) shown below the nodes gives a tree with total 
deviance 2.900. This is lower than the previous deviance. No other choice of 
independent variable or location to split Timeline would have resulted in a 
lower total deviance for the tree to this point. 
3. S-Plus then repeats the process for each node. That is, the left node with 
deviance 1.800 is split into two nodes with the greatest reduction in variance, 
as is the right node with deviance 1.100. It will continue to repeat the process, 
considering all possible branches from all possible nodes. 
4. S-Plus will stop the process only when a node is pure (i.e. all MOE scores in 
the node are equal) or when the data are too sparse (in this case, when the data 
cannot be broken into groups larger than five). Once that occurs, the node is 
called a terminal node or "leaf' and is represented by a rectangle. S-Plus will 
not consider creating any branches from the leaves. 
5. The tree is complete when there are no more branches to make. The resulting 
tree has all terminal nodes. The sum of the deviances shown below the leaves is 
the total deviance for the tree. Note that the total deviance for the tree in 
Figure 3 is 1.510, which is well below the original deviance of3.400. 
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Figure 3. Regression tree for ·planning phase. 
Simply put, for the regression trees and classification trees, the root nodes (at the 
top) split on the most significant indicators. Leaves predict the MOE sCOre depending on 
the values of the independent variables above the leaf For example, the leaf that has value 
"0.37" in Figure 3 predicts that company teams that have Timeline values less than 0.345 
and greater than 0.325 will have an MOE score of 0.37. The deviance is a measure of how 
good that prediction may be. 
Regression trees offer predicted MOE scores for each leaf of the tree. They are 
built using the MOE scores as the dependent variables. Classification trees predict whether 
the company teams will be "more survivable" or "less survivable." The dependent 
variables for classification trees are either" 1" for more survivable or "0" for less 
survivable. 
Deviance of a node is the total sum of squared differences between the MOE 
scores in the node and the mean MOE score for the node. This is calculated by taking the 
difference between the mean MOE score for the node and the MOE score for each data 
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point, squaring it, and adding it to the other squared differences for the data set. For the 
entire 88-line data set, the mean MOE score is 0.77. The total deviance is 4.870. This 
means that the total squared differences between each MOE score and 0.77 is 4.870. (The 
mean and deviance are somewhat different in Figure 3 because this particular tree uses 
only 57 lines of data. The lines with.missing observations were not used.) 
For each tree used in this research, a cross-validation was performed. Cross-
validation seeks to find the right size tree - the size that does not over-fit the data and has 
good predictability. Cross-validation randomly splits the data into ten (roughly) equal 
parts. Part 1 is withheld and trees are built using the other 90 percent of the data. Trees 
are built for sizes 1 (one terminal node), 2, 3, etc. The data values that were withheld are 
then dropped down the tree of each size, each value landing in a leaf giving a prediction 
for each. The deviance of these predictions is computed. This process is repeated for Part 
2 of the data, then Part 3, etc., until all ten parts have been considered. The result is a plot 
showing the size of the tree vs. the minimum deviance of the ten trees constructed of that 
size. Figure 4 shows a plot of the output of S-Plus's cross-validation method for the tree 
shown in Figure 3. The bottom axis refers to the size of the tree measured by the number 
of leaves. The vertical axis shows the minimum deviance for the tree of corresponding 
size. Since the goal is to create the right sized tree, we choose to "prune" the tree to have 
size = 6. By pruning the tree we get a model with less deviance that still offers good 
predictive ability. The top axis displaying the values of the sequencing parameter for each 
tree was not used in this analysis. 
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Figure 4. Example of a cross-validation plot of a regression tree. 
For each part Research Question 1, the regression and classification trees showed 
the same indicators as most significant; therefore, only the regression trees are shown. 
Later research questions will show both types of trees. 
Linear statistical models were examined using the S-Plus stepwise function. 
The stepwise procedure uses an exhaustive search to identify a set of independent 
variables to include in a least squares multiple regression. This research used the forward 
procedure with a maximum size of one. (Later research questions will use different 
maximum sizes, which will be explained at that time.) Thus it will return the single 
independent variable that has the largest impact on the value of the dependent variable 
(MOE score). Each phase below includes a summary of the linear model made from the 
single indicator. 
For the planning phase, trees and linear models were made using MOE score as the 
dependent variable and the following indicators as the independent variables: 
• Warning Order / Graphics 
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• Operations Order 
• Risk Assessment 
• Timeline 
• Direct Fire Plan 
The analysis was performed twice - with and without Timeline - because 34 percent of 
the data points do not include values for Timeline. The analysis with Timeline examined 57 
company teams and the analysis without considered 86 company teams. (Even with 
Timeline removed, there were still two company teams excluded due to incomplete data.) 
Figures 3 and 5, respectively, show the size = 6 regression tree and linear model 
for the planning phase (including Timeline). They show the following: 
• Regression tree: 
- Timeline < 0.345 predicts an MOE score of 0.66. Thisincludes 27 of the 
57 cases. 
- Timeline> 0.345 predicts an MOE score of 0.85. This includes 30 of the 
57 cases. 
• Linear model: Risk Assessment is most significant. However, notice that the p-
value for the indicator is 0.1342. This tells us that, although risk assessment is 
more indicative of survivability then the other independent variables, risk 
assessment by itself is still not a significant indicator of survivability. 
> summary (rq1plan. lm) 
Call: lm(formula = MOE3 - Risk, data RQ1Plan1) 
Residuals: 
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
-0.5379 -0.159 0.03255 0.2148 0.3284 
Coefficients: 
Value Std. Error t value Pr (> I t I) 
(Intercept) 0.6716 0.0649 10.3514 0.0000 
Risk 0.1136 0.0747 1.5202 0.1342 
Residual standard error: 0.2428 on 55 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.04032 
F-statistic: 2.311 on 1 and 55 degrees of freedom, the 
p-value is 0.1342 
Figure 5. Linear model of the planning phase. 
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Thus, for the planning phase (considering Timeline) the most significant indicators 
of survivability are Timeline Utilization and Risk Assessment. There are two surprises 
here. First, although it is not surprising that Timeline is most significant among the 
planning phase indicators, it is surprising in what it predicts. It shows that, for this data 
set, company teams that used more of their timeline than the recommended 33 percent 
actually were more survivable in the battles. One possible explanation for this has to do 
with what those more survivable company teams were doing prior to the issuance of the 
OPORD. One could reasonably assume that the more survivable company teams actively 
begin the preparation phase prior to receiving their OPORD. They can conduct 
maintenance, boresighting, and pre-combat inspections early if the commander needs more 
time to prepare the OPORD. Also, the commander might delay the OPORD to conduct 
reconnaissance that will allow for a better prepared OPORD. Second, we typically 
presume Risk Assessment to be less indicative of battle actions than the other available 
indicators. That a linear model would show it as most significant can best be attributed to 
the actual evaluations. Most of the company teams (78 percent) performed risk assessment 
to standard. Those few that were not to standard were generally below standard in many 
other tasks and, subsequently, were not very survivable during those battles. 
Figures 6 and 7, respectively, show the size = 3 regression tree and linear model 
for the planning phase (excluding Timeline). They show the following: 
• Regression tree: 
- Risk Assessment < 0.5 predicts an MOE score of 0.71. This includes 18 of 
the 86 cases. 
- Risk Assessment> 0.5 predicts an MOE score of 0.78. This includes 68 of 
the 86 cases. 
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Figure 6. Regression tree for planning phase (without Timeline). 
> summary (rq1plan2 . 1m) 
Call: Im(for.mula = MOE3 - Risk, data = RQ1Plan2) 
Residuals: 
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
-0.5359 -0.1419 0.05065 0.2168 0.2926 
Coefficients: 
Value Std. Error t value Pr (> I t I) 
(Intercept) 0.7074 0.0559 12.6615 0.0000 
Risk 0.0758 0.0628 1.2072 0.2307 
Residual standard error: 0.237 on 84 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.01705 
F-statistic: 1.457 on 1 and 84 degrees of freedom, the 
p-value is 0.2307 
Figure 7. Linear model of planning phase (excluding Timeline). 
Risk Assessment is again the most indicative of survivability among planning phase 
indicators. Although this is somewhat surprising, one explanation is available in the 
previo~s section (from the linear model of the planning phase - including Timeline). 
Another explanation has to do with the predictive ability of these particular models. The 
tree predicts MOE scores of 0.71 and 0.78 depending upon Risk Assessment, but those 
scores are relatively close. Note also that the total deviance of the tree dropped only 0.10 
(from to 4.80 to 4.70) after the first split. Also note that the p-value in the linear model 
(0.2307) is well above the rejection value of 0.05. These predictions are simply not very 
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helpful. All they really tell us is that this data does not support an adequate answer to the 
research question. 
For the preparation phase, trees and a linear model were made of the MOE score 
with respect to the following indicators: 
• Security Operations 
• Combat Service Support 
• Rehearsal Quality 
• Rehearsal Type 
• Boresight 
• Pre-Combat Inspection 
• Maintenance (Operational Readiness Rate) 
Figures 8 and 9, respectively, show the size = 2 regression tree and linear model 
for the preparation. They show the following: 
• Regression tree: 
- Secure < 0.5 predicts an MOE score of 0.68. This includes 37 of the 79 
cases. 
- Secure> 0.5 predicts an MOE score of 0.84. This includes 42 of the 79 
cases. 
• Linear model: Secure is most significant. 
c;fP 
Secur!!<o.: \ 
~ Secure>0.5 0.68 0.B4 
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Figure 8. Regression tree for preparation phase. 
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> summary (rq1prep. 1m) 
Call: 1m (formula = MOE3 - Secure, data = RQ1Prep) 
Residuals: 
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
-0.5932 -0.1223 0.02347 0.1595 0.3212 
Coefficients: 
Value Std. Error t value Pr (> I t I) 
(Intercept) 0.6788 0.0362 18.7716 0.0000 
Secure 0.1617 0.0496 3.2602 0.0017 
Residual standard error: 0.22 on 77 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.1213 
F-statistic: 10.63 on 1 and 77 degrees of freedom, the 
p-value is 0.001659 
Figure 9. Linear model of preparation phase. 
The models clearly show Security Operations as most indicative among the 
preparation phase tasks of survivability. This is somewhat surprising, since OICs at the 
NTC stress boresight and rehearsal quality as the most important tasks to perform well 
during the preparation phase. One possible explanation follows in answer to Research 
Question 3. 
For the execution phase, trees and a linear model were made of the MOE score 
with respect to the following indicators: 
• Actions on Contact 
• Volume of Fire 
• Effects of Casualties Among the Leadership (perLost, PerDeg, PerFull, and 
LostB4Cdr) 
• Effects of Enemy Engagement Areas 
• Causes of Loss of Systems (Direct Fire, Artillery, Mines, Maintenance) 
Similar to the planning phase, the execution phase was examined twice, with and without 
Actions on Contact. For 17 percent of the data, Actions on Contact evaluations were not 
available. 
Figures 10 and 11, respectively, show the size = 3 regression tree and linear model 
for the execution phase (including Actions on Contact). They show the following: 
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• Regression tree: 
- PerLost < 0.24 predicts an MOE score of 0.91. This includes 29 of the 65 
cases. 
- PerLost> 0.24 predicts an MOE score of 0.63. This includes 36 of the 65 
cases. 
• Linear model: PerLost is most significant. 
~.75 3. PerLoskO.23585 ~PerLOSI>O.23685 0.91 ~.63 . 2. 
PerFulkO.2096 
.-L. PerFul'r>0.2096 
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Figure 10. Regression tree of the execution phase. 
> summary ( rg1 ex1 .lm) 
Call: Im(formula = MOE3 - PerLost, data = RQEx1) 
Residuals: 
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
-0.4328 -0.1318 0.05324 0.1387 0.4267 
Coefficients: 
Value Std. Error t value Pr (> I t I) 
(Intercept) 0.9248 0.0406 22.7688 0.0000 
PerLost -0.4573 0.0859 -5.3267 0.0000 
Residual standard error: 0.2028 on 63 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Sguared: 0.3105 
F-statistic: 28.37 on 1 and 63 degrees of freedom, the 
p-value is 1.426e-006 
Figure 11. Linear model of execution phase (including Actions on Contact). 
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Thus, for the execution phase (including Actions on Contact), the effect of 
casualties among the leadership is clearly the most significant. In other words, those 
company teams who are able to fight the battles with the lowest proportion of time 
coming after leadership (commanders, executive officers, platoon leaders, and platoon 
sergeants) is lost are more survivable. Conversely, company teams that fight higher 
proportions of the battles with the full complement of their leadership alive are more 
survivable. This is not surprising at all and will be addressed further in Chapter V. 
Figures 12 and 13, respectively, show the size = 4 regression and linear model for 
the execution phase (excluding Actions on Contact). They show the following: 
• Regression tree: 
- PerFull < 0.43 predicts an MOE score of 0.65. This includes 47 of the 82 
cases. 
- PerFull> 0.43 predicts an MOE score of 0.92. This includes 35 of the 82 
cases. 
• Linear model: PerFull is most significant. 











Figure 12. Regression tree of execution phase (excluding Actions on Contact). 
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> summary (rq1ex2 .lm) 
Call: lm(formula = MOE3 - PerFull, data = RQEx2) 
Residuals: 
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
-0.3818 -0.121 0.0002016 0.1015 0.4392 
Coefficients: 
Value Std. Error t value Pr (> I t I) 
(Intercept) 0.5413 0.0401 13.4972 0.0000 
PerFull 0.5269 0.0804 6.5575 0.0000 
Residual standard error: 0.1937 on 80 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.3496 
F-statistic: 43 on 1 and 80 degrees of freedom, the 
p-value is 4.957e-009 
Figure 13. Linear model of execution phase (excluding Actions on Contact). 
Excluding Actions on Contact does not change the answer to Research Question 1 
for the execution phase. The effect of casualties among the leadership remains the most 
significant among execution phase indicators; however, the larger sample allows for 
greater confidence in this answer. 
Research Question 2. "In which of the three phases is successful task performance 
most indicative of a more survivable company team?" 
This question required closer examination of each phase for each battle. To assess 
performance within each phase, we need to determine the company teams' performance 
relative to each other. To do so, this research assessed the company team that performed 
the tasks for a given phase better than the other company teams from the same task force 
as being the best for that battle. Each task was considered to be of equal importance - in 
other words, they were equally weighted with respect to each other. That company team 
that was assessed as being the best was then given a score of "Best" for that phase of the 
operation. Similarly, the company team that performed the tasks worse than the others for 
that phase was assessed as the worst company team for that phase and given a score of 
"Worst". The remaining company teams were given scores of "Mid". This assignment 
system rendered scoring results as shown in Table 3. 
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I 
Company Teams in the Task Force Best-to-Worst Scores Assigned 
2 Best, Worst 
3 Best, Mid, Worst 
4 Best, Mid, Mid, Worst 
5 Best, Mid, Mid, Mid, Worst 
Table 3. Description of phase scoring for Research QuestIon 2. 
Table 4 gives an example of how one task force battle was examined to assign 
scores for the preparation phase. Notice that Bravo Team performed better than or equal 
to the other teams in every task except rehearsal type (their dismounted rehearsal was an 
inferior type to Alpha Team's mounted rehearsal, but better than Charlie and Delta Teams' 
check-the-block rehearsals). Thus, Bravo Team was assigned a preparation phase score of 
"Best", which is seen in the right-most column. Also notice that Charlie Team performed 
worse than or equal to the other teams in every task except maintenance (OR Rate). Thus, 
Charlie Team was assigned a preparation phase score of "Worst". The other company 
teams were assigned scores of "Mid" for the preparation phase. 
Co.Tm Secure CSS RehQual RehType Boresight PCI OR Rate Prep 
Alpha 0 0 1 M 1 0 0.67 Mid 
Bravo 1 1 1 D 1 0 l.00 Best 
Charlie 0 0 0 C 1 0 l.00 Worst 
Delta 1 1 0 C 1 0 0.79 Mid 
Table 4. Example of scoring assignments for a single phase. 
To determine which phase was most indicative of survivability, this research also 
used trees and linear models. Again, cross validation was used to determine the best tree 
size and stepwise was used to chose the proper independent variable for the linear 
model. The resulting regression tree is shown in Figure 14 and the resulting linear model is 
shown in Figure 15. For both of these, the MOE score was the dependent variable and the 
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Figure 14. Regression tree of MOE with respect to performance in the 3 phases. 
> summary(rq2C.lm) 
Call: lm(formula = MOE3 - Ex, data RQ2C) 
Residuals: 
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
-0.5673 -0.1483 0.03922 0.142 0.3018 
Coefficients: 
Value Std. Error t value Pr (> I t I) 
(Intercept) 0.7623 0.0252 30.2285 0.0000 
Ex1 -0.0636 0.0320 -1.9908 0.0498 
Ex2 -0.0320 0.0172 -1.8637 0.0659 
Residual standard error: 0.229 on 83 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.0941 
F-statistic: 4.311 on 2 and 83 degrees of freedom, the 
p-value is 0.01655 
Figure 15. Linear model of MOE with respect to execution phase performance. 
Both models show that performance in the execution phase is most indicative of a 
more survivable company team. The regression tree, specifically, shows the following: 
• Company teams that perform the best in the execution phase can expect an 
MOE score of 0.86. Those that perform the worst or in the middle can expect 
an MOE score of 0.71. This model placed 33 of the 86 company teams in the 
"0.86" node and the remaining 53 company teams in the "0.71" node. 
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Research Question 3. "All things taken equally, which potential indicators offer 
the best predictions of how survivable company teams will be?" 
There are two reasonable ways to answer this question. First, build an overall 
model to represent the entire set of data. Second, build a model from everything except 
the execution phase to be used as a predictive tool immediately prior to a battle. 
Both of these analyses are conducted in the same way as the analyses from 
Research Question 1. These analyses make use of regression trees and classification trees 
(with cross-validation to determine the sizes), as well as linear models. As with the 
regression trees, the classification trees will examine relationships between the 
independent variables and survivability. However, instead of using the MOE score as the 
dependent variable as the regression trees did, it will use a classification of survivability. 
This classification comes from dividing the company teams into two groups based on their 
MOE scores. As before, those company teams that received an MOE score greater than 
0.65 are classified as "more survivable" and the remaining company teams are classified as 
"less survivable". Classification trees show the misclassification rate below the nodes. 
Instead, they. Consider the classification tree in Figure 17, for example. The root node 
shows an "M" in the middle and the fraction "19/68" below. This means that the majority 
of the points in the node were more survivable ("M"), but 19 of the 68 points in the node 
are misclassified by this label (not more survivable). 
Figures 16, 17 and 18, respectively, show the size = 3 regression tree, 
classification tree, and linear model of the data (including execution phase). These were all 
made without Timeline and Actions on Contact. Each model was originally constructed 
using all indicators; however, Timeline and Actions on Contact did not appear significant 
in any of them. The models including Timeline and Actions on Contact were able to use 
only 43 lines of information because of missing data. Because eliminating them from 
consideration allowed for inclusion of more of the data set ( 68 lines), these two variables 
were dropped for this analysis. The linear model was built with argument "best = 3" in 
order to determine the three most influential indicators of survivability. This number was 
chosen arbitrarily with the intent to determine which three among the twenty independent 
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Figure 16. Regression tree (excluding Timeline and Actions on Contact). 












Figure 17. Classification tree (excluding Timeline and Actions on Contact). 
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> summary (rq3Im) 
Call: lm(formula = MOE3 - PerFu11 + TMB + Secure, data = 
RQ3R) 
Residuals: 
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
-0.4147 -0.119 0.001357 0.09511 0.3921 
Coefficients: 
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>ltl) 
(Intercept) 0.4875 0.0467 10.4322 0.0000 
PerFu11 0.4295 0.0831 5.1675 0.0000 
TMB1 0.0362 0.0381 0.9482 0.3467 
TMB2 0.0477 0.0166 2.8653 0.0057 
Secure 0.1145 0.0451 2.5349 0.0137 
Residual standard error: 0.1805 on 63 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.446 
F-statistic: 12.68 on 4 and 63 degrees of freedom, the 
p-value is 1.251e-007 
Figure 18. Linear model (excluding Timeline and Actions on Contact). 
The regression tree shows PerFull and Secure as most significant. This means the 
following: 
• Company teams that maintain a full complement of their leadership for more 
than 27.735 percent of the battle (PerFull > 0.27735) can expect an MOE 
score of 0.86. Those who lose some of their leadership before the battle is 
27.735 percent complete can expect an MOE score ofO.58. 
• For company teams with PerFull < 0.27735, those that do not meet the 
standard on security operations can expect an MOE score of 0.47, while those 
who meet the standard can expect an MOE score of 0.72. 
The classification tree shows PerDeg and Secure as most significant. This means 
the following: 
• Company teams that fight more than 60.555 percent of the battle with their 
leadership degraded through combat losses (PerDeg > 0.60555) can expect to 
be "less survivable". All 31 company teams that had PerDeg < 0.60555 were 
"more survivable". 
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• Among those company teams with PerDeg > 0.60555, those that perform 
security operations to standard can expect to be more survivable and those that 
do not can expect to be less survivable. Twelve of sixteen company teams in 
this category were more survivable. 
• Among those company teams with PerDeg > 0.60555 and Security = 0 (not 
performed to standard), those that fight less than 79.89 percent of the battle 
with a degraded level ofleadership (perDeg < 0.7989) can expect to be more 
survivable. All ten company teams that had PerDeg > 0.7989 were less 
survivable. 
The linear model shows the presence.ofleadership (perFull), security operations, 
and task organization (dominant system - tank, mechanized infantry, or balanced) as most 
significant. Note that PerFull, TMB2, and Secure all have p-values that are less than 0.05. 
This means that they all have significant relationships with the MOE score. The higher p-
value for TMB 1 is typical of categorical variables. Because the responses for TMB are 
"tank", "mechanized", or "balanced", the linear model will label them alphabetically and 
only include two of the responses in the model. TMB would not be significant if both of 
the p-values for the listed responses were greater than 0.05. 
Overall, the effects of casualties among the leadership and performance of security 
operations are common to all three models. The models give a telling representation of 
company team survivability throughout the course of an operation. They basically say that 
company teams that keep their leadership alive and in the fight are more survivable than 
others. Further, they say that this is the primary discriminator between more and less 
survivable company teams. This is not terribly surprising, but it effectively points out the 
importance ofleadership survival compared to all of the other indicators. The importance 
of security operations, however, is somewhat surprising. Although it is no surprise that 
security operations are important (see Potential Indicators), it is somewhat surprising that 
security operations are more indicative of company team survivability than many others. 
One possible explanation comes from Sergeant First Class Yamasta, a platoon OIC in the 
Armor Task Force Training Team (Cobras). When asked what he thought would be the 
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most significant indicator of a more survivable company team, he immediately answered: 
"I know as soon as I see how well they do their security operations." He went on to 
explain that more disciplined units maintain their security operations right from the 
beginning of the rotation. Because they are more disciplined as a unit, they will be more 
survivable in most of their battles during the rotation. Also, if company team morale 
begins to wane, it shows up first during the preparation phase when they drop their guard 
and stop performing their security operations to standard [Ref 8]. 
Figures 19,20, and 21, respectively, show the size = 5 regression tree, 
classification tree, arid linear model of the data excluding the execution phase. The models 
were made without regard to Timeline for the same reasons as the models that included 
the execution phase. 
(oJ6) 
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Figure 19. Regression tree (excluding execution phase). 
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Figure 20. Classification tree (excluding execution phase). 
> summary(rq3PPlm) 
Call: 1m ( formula = MOE3 - OPORD + TMB + Secure, data = RQ3RPP) 
Residuals: 
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
-0.5196 
-0.112 0.01637 0.1386 0.3372 
Coefficients: 
Value Std. Error t value Pr (> I t I) (Intercept) 0.7047 0.0447 15.7543 0.0000 OPORD 
-0.1097 0.0512 
-2.1440 0.0356 TMB1 0.0200 0.0396 0.5043 0.6156 TMB2 0.0349 0.0182 1.9143 0.0598 Secure 0.1868 0.0508 3.6799 0.0005 
Residual standard error: 0.2095 on 68 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.2368 
F-statistic: 5.275 on 4 and 68 degrees of freedom, the 
p-value is 0.0009252 
Figure 21. Linear model (excluding execution phase). 
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The trees show performance of security operations, task organization (dominant 
system), pre-combat inspections and operations orders as most significant. The regression 
tree, specifically, shows the following: 
• Company teams that perform their security operations to standard (Secure = 1) 
can expect an MOE score of 0.84. This terminal node contained 40 of the 73 
available company teams. Those who do not can expect an MOE score of 0.67. 
• Among company teams with Secure = 0, balanced units can expect an MOE 
score ofOA7. This terminal node contained only five of the remaining 33 
company teams. The tank heavy and mechanized company teams that do not 
perform security operations to standard can expect an MOE score of 0.71. 
• Among company teams with Secure = 0 that are not balanced, those that do 
not perform their pre-combat inspections to standard (pCI = 0) can expect an 
MOE score of 0.62. This terminal node contained 13 of the remaining 28 
company teams. Those with PCI = 1 can expect an MOE score of 0.79. 
The linear model shows performance of security operations, task organization 
(dominant system) and operations order as most significant. Strangely, though, the 
coefficient for the OPORD variable is negative. This implies that doing worse on the 
OPORD indicates a larger MOE score for the company team. This will be discuss"ed 
further in Chapter V. Also note that neither of the p-values for TMB are less than 0.05, 
although the lowest is close (0.0598). 
Overall, performance of security operations and task organization figured 
prominently in all three models ofthe data taken prior to the execution phase of the 
operation. The importance of task organization is not surprising - we should not expect 
Bradley equipped company teams to be as survivable as those with tanks. This topic will 
be revisited in Research Question 6. The importance of security operations remains 
somewhat surprising, with the best available explanation coming from SFC Yamasta 
(stated earlier). 
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Research Question 4. "Which indicators, when examined individually, differ 
significantly between more and less survivable company teams?" 
Answering this question required the use of three different tests, depending upon 
the nature of the data for the various indicators. Binomial tests were performed for 
indicators that were evaluated as "to standard" or "not to standard". Contingency tables 
were used to test categorical data. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests were used for the remaining 
indicators. The data for these indicators were all values between zero and one (inclusive), 
but not expected to follow a Normal distribution. The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was 
chosen because of its non-parametric nature. A description and example of each type of 
test follows. After that is a table summarizing the results of the test for each indicator. All 
tests treated company teams with an MOE score greater than 0.65 as "more survivable" 
and those with an MOE score less than 0.65 as "less survivable" (see Research Question 
1). 
The binomial test treats the data as if there were n Bernoulli trials related to the 
more survivable company teams and m Bernoulli trials related to the less survivable 
company teams. We test whether the true probability of success for more survivable 
company teams is the same as for less survivable company teams: 
Ho: p more survivable = P less survivable 
HI: p more survivable> p less survivable 
Note: HI varies for some indicators. Some will have ::j; or < instead of >. HI for each 
indicator is shown in Table 5. This research continues to use an a = 0.05 as the level of 
significance. In other words, we have one chance in twenty of rejecting Ho when it is true. 
Letting x = the number of "to standard" evaluations among the n more survivable 
company teams, and y = the number of "to standard" evaluations among the m less 
survivable company teams, we reject Ho whenever 
x y 
n m ~===================2>Za 




This test was also used to determine the significance of effort (main vs. 
supporting), whether or not the unit was "pure" (as opposed to receiving attachments), and 
the mission type (offensive vs. defensive) [Ref. 9]. 
As an example, consider security operations. There were n = 61 more survivable 
company teams (MOE score> 0.65). Of these, x = 41 company teams performed security 
operations to standard. Of the m = 22 less survivable company teams, only y = 4 
performed security operations to standard. For the equation above: 
• n = 61, m = 22, x = 41, Y = 4 
• The test statistic is 3.957. 
• Za is 1.645. 
• Because 3.957 2:: 1.645, we reject Ho, with a p-value of 3.79E-05. 
Table 5, below, shows the results of all Binomial tests that were conducted. Note 
the * in the right most column signifies those indicators that had a statistically significant 
(Ho was rejected) relationship with survivability. 
Indicators n m x y Test Stat. HI p-value 
Type of Effort (main,supporting) 61 22 17 4 0.8960 Pm<PI 0.815 
Unit Purity (v~. attachments) 65 23 15 6 -0.2911 Pm>PI 0.614 
Mission Type (off., def.) 65 23 51 18 0.02010 Pm"*PI 0.984 
OPORD (to standard, not t.s.) 64 23 32 12 -0.1788 Pm>PI 0.571 
Risk Assessment (t.s., n.t.s) 64 23 52 16 1.163 Pm>PI 0.122 
Timeline (::;;0.33, >0.33) 40 18 15 10 -1.284 pm> PI 0.901 
Direct Fire Plan (t.s., n.t.s) 63 23 20 7 0.1159 Pm>PI 0.454 
Security Operations (t.s., n.t.s) 61 22 41 4 3.957 Pm>PI 3. 1 E-05 * 
Combat Service Spt. (t.s., n.t.s) 64 23 47 12 1.872 Pm>PI 0.0306* 
Rehearsal Quality (t.s., n.t.s) 63 23 31 7 1.552 Pm>Pl 0.0604 
Boresight (t.s., n.t.s) 64 23 53 15 1.752 Pm>PI 0.0399* 
Pre-Combat Inspect., (t.s., n.t.s) 64 23 40 11 1.226 Pm> PI 0.110 
Actions on Contact (t.s., n.t.s) 58 12 31 3 1.795 pm> PI 0.036* 
Table 5. Binomial data tests. * = significance at ex = 0.05. 
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Contingency tables were used to test whether or not the categories for an indicator 
are independent of survivability. Consider, for example, task organization. Table 6 shows 
the contingency table for the company team's dominant system. There are separate 
columns for tank, mechanized, and balanced company teams. The rows identify the more 
and less survivable company teams. The top left entry, then, shows that there were 35 
tank-heavy company teams that were more survivable. The far right column shows the 
sums for the rows. The bottom row shows the sums for the columns. 
For contingency tables, we presume as a null hypothesis that the categories are 
independent. This means the proportion of more survivable company teams is the same 
for all types of company teams. Expected values were computed as follows: 
E d[T k M ] (Total (More )XTotal(Tank ) xpecte .I. an, are == 
Total 
Thus, the expected number of more survivable, tank-heavy company teams is (65 
more survivable company teams) * (40 tank-heavy company teams) / (88 total company 
teams) = 29.55 company teams. 
Tank Mechanized Balanced 
More Survivable 35 24 6 
E[More Survivable] 29.55 27.33 8.12 
Less Survivable 5 13 5 
E[Less Survivable] 10.45 9.67 2.87 
Total 40 37 11 
Table 6. Contingency table for task organization (dominant system). 
Formally, for a contingency table test: 
• Ho: dominant system and survivability are independent 
• HI: dominant system and survivability are dependent 
• ex= 0.05 
• The test statistic: 
L (Value - E[Value D2 
E[Value] 






For the contingency table above, the test statistic is 7.531. Because there are two 
rows and three columns, the critical value is X2.05,2' which is 5.991. Since 7.531 ~ 5.991, 
we reject Ho with a p-value of 0.0232 and conclude that survivability varies for the 
different task organizations [Ref. 9]. 
Tables 7 and 8, respectively, show the contingency tables for size of company 
team and for rehearsal type. For both of these indicators Ho is accepted. It appears that the 
probability of being more survivable does not differ for levels of either of these variables. 
Normal Large Small Total 
More Survivable 54 3 8 65 
E[More Survivable] 52.44 3.69 8.86 
Less Survivable 17 2 4 23 
E[Less Survivable] 18.56 1.31 3.14 
Total 71 5 12 88 
Table 7. Contmgency table for task organization (size of company team). 
Mounted Dismounted CheckBlock None Total 
More Survivable 19 13 21 8 61 
E[More Survivable] 18.6 12.65 20.83 8.93 
Less Survivable 6 4 7 4 21 
E[Less Survivable] 6.4 4.35 7.17 3.07 
Total 25 17 28 12 82 
Table 8. Contingency table for rehearsal type. 
The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is a non-parametric test used to determine if the 
distribution of an indicator for the more survivable company teams is the same as the 
distribution for the less survivable company teams. To use the test, we first rank order the 
values for each indicator. For instance, the lowest value for PerDeg (percentage of the 
battle fought with a degraded level of leadership) is zero, so that data point is assigned a 
rank of 1. This continues through all available data points for that indicator. Once that is 
done, we sum the ranks from the more survivable company teams. The necessary 
calculations are as follows: 
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• m = the number of more survivable company teams. 
• n = the number of less survivable company teams. 
• S = the sum of the ranks from the more survivable company teams. 
• E[S] = m(m + n + 1) / 2. 
• Var[S] = mn(m + n + 1) /12. 
• The test statistic is: 
S -E[S] 
~Var[S ] 
• Ho: fmore survivable(X) = f less survivable(X). 
• HI: fmore survivable(X) = f less survivable(X + S). 
• a=0.05 
• Reject Ho if the test statistic S -Za .. 
For PerDeg: m = 63, n = 23, and S = 2467. Therefore, the test statistic is -2.668. 
Since the critical value is -1.645, we reject Ho with a p-value of 0.00381 [Ref. 10]. Table 
9, below, shows a summary of all Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests for this research. An * 
indicates those indicators giving p-value S 0.05. 
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Indicator HI m n S E[S] Var[S] test stat. p-value 
WARNORD fm=f1+9 64 23 2919 2816 10795 0.991 0.161 
Timeline fm:;tfl 40 18 1238 1180 3540 0.975 0.330 
OR Rate fm=f1+9 65 23 2956 2892 11088 0.598 0.275 
Volume of Fire fm:;tfl 62 23 2722 2666 10220 0.554 0.580 
Engage. Area fm=f1+9 64 23 3022 2816 10795 1.983 0.0237* 
PerDeg fm=fl-9 63 23 2467 2740 10505 -2.668 0.0038* 
PerLost fm=fl-9 63 22 2545 2709 9933 -1.646 0.0499* 
LostB4Cdr fm=f1+9 63 22 2864 2709 9933 1.555 0.0599 
DirFire Losses fm:;tfl 65 23 3083 2892 11088 1.809 0.0704 
Artillery fm:;tfl 65 23 2609 2892 11088 3.542 3.97E-4* 
Losses 
Maint. Losses fm:tfl 65 23 3054 2892 11088 0.684 0.494 
Mine Losses fm:;tfl 65 23 2973 2892 11088 0.195 0.846 
Table 9. Wicoxon Rank-Sum tests. * = significance at ex = 0.05. 
In answer to the research question, then, the following indicators, when examined 
individually, differ significantly between more and less survivable company teams: 
• Performance of Security Operations. 
• Performance of Combat Service Support Operations. 
• Performance of Boresight Operations. 
• Performance of Actions on Contact. 
• Proportion of the battle fought with a Degraded Level of Leadership. 
• Proportion of the battle fought with Leadership Lost. 
• Proportion of Losses to Indirect Fire. 
• Effects of Enemy Engagement Areas. 
• Task Organization (Dominant System). 
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The above indicators were shown to have significant relationships with survivability by 
one of the three tests described above. 
Research Question 5. "Does task organization affect company team 
survivability? " 
There are three ways to examine this question. Does the company team's principal 
system have any affect? Does the size of the company team matter? Do attached assets 
affect survivability? Each of these questions was answered in Research Question 4. A 
brief description follows. 
The company team's principal system does affect company team survivability. 
This was shown with a contingency table (Table 6). Tank heavy company teams are more 
survivable than mechanized and balanced company teams. This is entirely reasonable; 
tanks are made to be the most survivable systems on the battlefield. Company teams with 
a higher proportion of Bradleys are more susceptible to losses from lower caliber 
weapons. 
Size of the company team is not an indicator of survivability. As shown in Table 7 
(Contingency table for size of company team), we cannot reject a null hypothesis that a 
company team's size and survivability are independent. 
Attached assets do not affect a company team's survivability. The proportion of 
more survivable company teams that were pure was 0.23. The proportion of less 
survivable company teams that were pure was 0.26. That is not a significant difference for 
this sample size. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the probability of a 
more survivable company team being pure is the same as the probability of a less 
survivable company team being pure. 
Research Question 6. "Does the type of mission cause different indicators to 
become more indicative of the level of company team survivability?" 
To answer this question, we begin by splitting the data into two sets, one set for 
offensive operations and another set for defensive operations. We then conduct analysis as 
we did for Research Question 3 to determine which independent variables are most 
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indicative of survivability. Figures 22 and 23, respectively, show the regression trees for 
the offensive and defensive operations. 
~.75 2.200 PerDeg<o'72265 
~perDf1J>0.72265 
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Figure 22. Regression tree for offensive operations. 
PerDeg<O.58$ 
,..---L----,p~,~i8~ 
Figure 23. Regression tree for defensive operations. 
Both trees show that the effect of casualties among the leadership as the most 
significant indicator of survivability. This was previously shown to be the most significant 
indicator for all operations (see Research Question 3, Figure 16). The regression tree for 
the defensive operations is much smaller because it had less data - only 25 percent of the 
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battles in the data set were defenses. One key difference shown here, though, is the 
presence of rehearsal quality performance as an indicator. Among those company teams 
that fight offensive battles with their leadership degraded more than 72.265 percent of 
time, those that conduct "to standard" rehearsals can expect an MOE score of 0.71. 
Among the same company teams, those that do not conduct their rehearsals to standard 
can expect an MOE score of 0.35. 
Because the performance of rehearsals is significant in offensive operations but not 
in all operations, we can say that this indicator is more relevant for offensive operations 
than defensive operations. This seems entirely logical. Rehearsals typically focus on the 
scheme of maneuver for an operation. For offensive operations, the movement formations 
and techniques that the platoons must execute often require significant rehearsal. 
Defensive operations, on the other hand, are usually not as reliant on successful maneuver. 
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v. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This research seeks to draw conclusions in three ways. First, it must answer the 
questions that were asked in Chapter I: "Which company team was the most survivable 
within its task force?" And furthermore "What did that company team do to become the 
most survivable?" In other words, what did the data tell us? Second, it should point out 
surprises that cause us to wonder about what the data did not tell us. Finally, it will 
examine the conclusions themselves to see if they are valid and relevant. 
This research answers the "which company team" question by developing an MOE 
based upon average survival time of systems within a company team relative to other 
company teams in the same task force. Although this is by no means a perfect way to 
assess survivability, it offers a quantitative method for comparison. A company team that 
scored 0.95 certainly did a better of job of keeping its systems alive than a company team 
from the same task force that scored 0.52. Despite any criticisms of the MOE, it 
accomplishs its purpose - it answers the question in such a way that we can go about the 
business of answering the more telling second question. 
The "what did that company team do" question was answered in detail in Chapter 
N. To summarize, there are three major and five minor differences between more and less 
survivable company teams. The more survivable company teams are usually tank pure or 
have been task organized to have more tanks than Bradleys. They keep their leadership 
alive longer, and they perform security operations to standard. And, generally, the more 
survivable company teams conduct boresight, actions on contact and combat service 
support operations to standard. They suffer a lower proportion of their losses to indirect 
fire and avoid the effects of enemy engagement areas (as defined in Chapter N, Section 
A). 
The above paragraphs relate what the data tell us. There are, however, some 
surprises. Certain indicators that are taught repeatedly in service schools which develop 
the Army's combat leaders and are further emphasized by BLUEFOR commanders and 
the National Training Center's Observer/Controllers do not show up as having significant 
relationships with survivability. We would expect that the more survivable company 
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teams would produce operations orders that were to standard more often than less 
survivable company teams do. We would expect the same about the quality of rehearsals. 
Also, we would expect those company teams that better manage their timeline and allow 
their subordinate leaders more preparation time would be more survivable. The data do 
not allow us to make such conclusions. Exactly half (32 of 64) of the more survivable 
company teams prepared their OPORDs to standard, while a similar proportion (12 of 23) 
of the less survivable company teams did so. Why this occurs is open to much speculation, 
the bulk of which centers on the subjective nature of the evaluations. This is the most 
complex task that the OICs evaluate subjectively; therefore, it is naturally the most 
variable among evaluators and OIC teams. As for rehearsal quality, a higher proportion 
(23 of 63) of more survivable company teams performed this task to standard than did the 
less survivable company teams (7 of 23). Because of the relatively small sample size, 
however, the difference is not statistically significant and we cannot draw any firm 
conclusion about the relationship between rehearsal quality and survivability (except for 
during offensive operations, as noted in Chapter IV in the analysis for Research Question 
6). Timeline management, however, might be the greatest mystery. Among the more 
survivable company teams, the average proportion of time used was 39 percent and only 
38 percent of those units met the "one-third I two-thirds" rule. Compare that to the less 
survivable company teams, who used an average of 34 percent of the available time and 
had 56 percent of the units meet the rule. One viable explanation is in Chapter IV as part 
of the answer to Research Question 1. In any event, the data do not allow us to draw any 
conclusions about the relationship between timeline utilization and survivability. 
We must consider whether these and other surprises imply that Army service 
schools, unit commanders, and OICs at the NTC have placed their emphasis in the wrong 
areas. Should they shift their priorities to focus on security operations and keeping unit 
leadership in the fight? Although that seems far-fetched and will be answered specifically 
in the recommendations that follow, we should reexamine the quality of the data from 
which the conclusions are drawn as well as their applications to survivability. 
Remember that the conclusions stated above are based upon manually gathered 
and largely subjective data. The manually collected data are inferior to what an automated 
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system could provide. Unfortunately, the current automated data collection and database 
system at the NTC has a low "pairing" rate that causes the collected data to be incomplete. 
In other words, most of the events that occur in the field do not get properly or completely 
logged into the database. Thus, any attempts at analysis of the automated data could be 
biased by a variety of automation factors, such as signal strength, etc. Also, the subjective 
nature of many of the evaluations cause disparity in data collection from the various OICs 
and OIC teams - despite their efforts to standardize among themselves. The teams 
evaluate different tasks and use different grading scales. The conclusions from this 
research could not include tasks that were not evaluated by all three OIC teams and were 
subject to scale modifications to make them compatible. 
As far as the conclusions' applications to survivability, we must take into account 
the formulation of the MOE. One problem with the MOE is that it will favor units which, 
by chance or design, are simply away from their task forces' most significant action. 
Another methodology could focus on lethality instead of (or along with) survivability. 
Given the NTC's current data collection assets, lethality is extremely difficult to judge. 
The automated system does not give an accurate assessment of who-killed-whom. Manual 
collection of these data, while not impossible, would significantly impact the other duties 
of the OICs as well as the OPFOR. 
Something else to consider when we examine survivability at the National 
Training Center is that the battles there are really just very high resolution models of 
combat. We would hope that real battles do not result in the high casualty levels that NTC 
battles do. Soldiers do not really die in battles fought with MILES. Through the course of 
their four or five MILES battles at the NTC, along with countless drills and battles at other 
training locations throughout their respective careers, soldiers become desensitized to 
being "hit" by MILES. It would be reasonable to assume that soldiers would behave 
differently if there were real bullets coming at them. An analysis of real battles would 
logically use a more definite MOE (like proportion of systems that survived the battle) and 
might very well bring different answers to the same questions. That point, however, is 
moot. The NTC is the most realistic place in the United States Army to analyze mounted 
operations. We cannot evaluate combat the way we evaluate training events. 
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That said, the conclusions of this research are valid. Their applicability, however, 
must consider the shortcomings noted above. The recommendations that follow, then, 
attempt to make the most of these conclusions while blending in the realities of 
experience. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The training community that should take note of these findings includes both units 
in the field as well as the relevant service schools. These schools include the Infantry and 
Annor Officer Advanced Courses, the Infantry and Annor Officer Basic Courses, and the 
Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Courses for 11Ms and 19Ks. (11M is the Military 
Occupational Specialty designation for mechanized infantrymen and 19K is the MOS 
designation for Abrams tank crewmen.) These courses teach the company commanders, 
platoon leaders and platoon sergeants, respectively, a variety of tasks that prepare them to 
perform their duties. 
Task forces should consider survivability when they assign task organizations for 
an operation. They must consider that their tank heavy company teams are more 
survivable than their mechanized company teams. This holds a variety of tactical 
implications for the planning staffs and is something that should be discussed during the 
staffs' wargaming of particular courses of action. 
Making concerted efforts to keep leadership alive in the battle is contrary to the 
lead-from-the-front attitude that many leaders believe in and teach to their subordinate 
leaders. But the claim remains: company teams that keep their leadership alive longer are 
more survivable. We must keep in mind that keeping leadership alive does not mean 
sacrificing subordinates. It means exercising caution when in contact. It means not 
blundering into engagement areas. It means taking a position from which to see the 
battlefield and then making life and death decisions for the leader himself, his 
subordinates, and the enemy~ Living leaders can lead their company teams to their 
objectives. Dead leaders cannot lead anyone. 
Units and schools should add focus to security operations. Service schools often 
overlook security operations in favor of other tasks. While they are all important, we 
cannot deny the significant relationship between security operations and survivability. 
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Small unit leaders must be proficient in all tasks that support security operations. Units 
need to stress these as part of their Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). A well-
disciplined company team conducts their security operations as a matter of 
professionalism. Because security operations must be maintained throughout a training 
event, those units that are able to maintain a secure posture and properly conduct security 
tasks are often professional enough to do many other things well. 
The NTC's Operations Group is working toward fixing its automated data 
collection problems. It needs to continue to do so. With each improvement in the pairing 
rate, the NTC should sample the database to see how well it compares to the current 
manual data collection. Comparisons for this research (made from the November 1997 
rotation) showed that the manual data is vastly superior to the automated data. The quality 
gap should improve with each increase in the pairing rate. Sampling could also point out 
problems other than the pairing rate that will need to be addressed before the database is 
to be of any use. 
The NTC should also adopt a standardized method of making and collecting 
subjective assessments. The Cobra Team experimented with one such system in the 
February 1998 rotation. Captain Dana Goulette's thesis, "Training Assessment and 
Modeling Subjective Data Encapsulation for the National Training Center," provides 
another system that would accomplish this [Ref. 4]. Once the NTC adopts a standardized 
system, data can be entered into the automated system and the two sources of data could 
then be analyzed for further research. Currently, data analysis conducted at the NTC must 
begin with data collection to fit each particular research project. If each team collects the 
same data measured on the same scale, future research can collect data "off the shelf'. 




APPENDIX A. SAMPLE DATA 
Below are the data from two of the task force battles that were used for this research. For 
ease of reading, they are broken into four sections. The first section includes the 
administrative data. The second, third, and fourth sections show the planning, preparation 
and execution phases, respectively. 
Rota- Train. Task Compo MOE Effort TMB NLS PX Mission 
tion Day Force Team Score 
98-03 1 3-8Cav CTank 0.38 Main Tank Large Xattach Offense 
98-03 1 3-8Cav DTank 1.00 Spt Bal. Small Xattach Offense 
98-03 1 3-8Cav A Mech 0.92 Spt Mech Normal Xattach Offense 
98-03 1 3-8Cav DMech 0.80 Spt Mech Normal Xattach Offense 
98-04 5 3-15Inf B Tank 0.87 Main Tank Normal Pure Offense 
98-04 5 3-15Inf CTank 0.50 Spt Tank Normal Xattach Offense 
98-04 5 3-15Inf A Mech 1.00 Spt Mech Normal Xattach Offense 
98-04 5 3-15Inf DMech 0.54 Spt Mech Normal Pure Offense 
WARNORD OPORD Risk Timeline Timeline Direct Fire 
& Graphics Assessment (percentage) (boolean) Plan 
1 0 1 0.33 1 0 
1 1 1 0.59 0 1 
1 1 1 0.38 0 1 
1 0 1 0.45 0 0 
1 1 1 0.62 0 0 
1 1 1 0.25 1 0 
0 0 1 0.20 1 0 
1 1 1 0.28 1 0 
Secure Combat Rehearsal Rehearsal Boresight Pre-Combat Oper. Ready 
Servo Spt Quality Type Inspection Rate 
0 0 1 Mounted 1 0 0.67 
1 1 1 Dismt. 1 0 1.00 
0 0 0 Check-block 1 0 1.00 
1 1 0 Check-block 1 0 0.79 
1 1 1 Mounted 1 1 0.86 
0 0 0 Check-block 1 0 0.57 
1 1 0 None 0 0 0.79 
0 1 1 Mounted 1 1 0.86 
AOCs Vol. Eng. Per. Per. Per. Lost Loss to Loss to Loss to Loss to 
Fire Area Full Deg. Lost B4Cdr DF Arty Maint Mine 
1 0.09 0.04 0.18 0.82 0.69 0.08 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 
1 0.21 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 
1 0.11 0.08 0.83 0.17 0.15 0.60 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.40 
1 0.03 0.08 0.82 0.18 0.10 0.83 0.54 0.00 0.45 0.00 
0 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.81 0.00 1.00 0.82 0.09 0.09 0.00 
1 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.82 0.70 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0.13 0.03 0.36 0.64 0.62 0.81 0.73 0.18 0.00 0.00 
NA 0.00 0.17 .0.25 0.75 0.72 0.92 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Average SurvTime: 103.36 Average SurvTime: 71.50 Average SurvTime: 114.73 Average SurvTime: 43.27 
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t.1:~o;t~,:,,:,,i"!lbI:~o~~;anJ'. te~~~r this battle i~ .. : .J..' ___ B:...IM""') __ ...... L .. " . "",,' 
Notes: Only record tanks and Bradleys 
········O~iYrecor;fsystem.~th~t~tartedthebati:ie 
Fill in all shaded areas 




TD: r------; .................................................. , ......................... . 
Mission: 
11 Team CO/TM: 
BMPR# TOD 
Total SurvTime: 








O;;ly re~~;:d sy~1:e;:;;~thats1:arted1:hebattle 
Fill in all shaded areas 
Record time in this format: 12:34 























Average SurvTime: 0.00 Average SUtv Time: 0.00 
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GLOSSARY 
AAR - After Action Review. An event that gives units an opportunity to reflect on what 
happened during an operation and identify those tasks which the unit must sustain 
proficiency and which the unit must improve to reach the standard. 
AO - Area of Operations. 
BDA - Battle Damage Assessment. A list of losses that occurred in a battle. It may 
include friendly and / or enemy losses, times of losses, causes of losses, etc. 
BLUEFOR - The unit that is training for combat. BLUEFOR is short for "Blue Force", 
which is a nickname for the "good guys" that is derived from the fact that military maps 
will show the drawers units and graphics in blue, while showing his or her enemy's in red. 
CA V - Cavalry. This term refers to a divisional cavalry squadron, regimental cavalry, and 
armor and mechanized infantry battalions of the 1 st Cavalry Division. 
COM - Change of Mission. This occurs at the end of a training battle. Its purpose is to 
instruct the training unit to discontinue its current operation and begin preparation of the 
next mission. 
CONUS - The Continental United States. 
corrM - Company / Team. This is a force, commanded by a captain, with a 
approximately 10 to 20 fighting systems (such as tanks, IFVs, infantry squads, etc.). A 
company is "pure", meaning it has its assigned equipment (14 tanks for a tank company, 
14 IFVs and 6 squads of infantry for a mechanized company), no more and no less. A 
team is a company that has been task organized for a particular mission or operation. This 
is usually accomplished by attaching or detaching platoons from one company to another. 
IFV - Infantry Fighting Vehicle. Similar to a tank in that they are armored and have some 
heavy weapons such as an anti-tank missile and/or machine guns. They carry infantry into 
battle and provide protection for them once dismounted. The United States Army uses the 
M2 Bradley as its IFV, similarly to other nations using the BMP (most for Soviet Block 
nations, most of the Arab nations), Scorpion and Scimitar (United Kingdom), etc., and the 
United States Marine Corps using the LAV25. 
MECH - Mechanized Infantry. 
MILES - Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System. See Chapter II. 
MTC - A movement to contact, which is an offensive operation that is conducted when 
an enemy's location and activity is unknown and / or uncontrolled. An MTC is conducted 
to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. 
77 
NTC - The National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. The NTC performs the 
mission of preparing battalion task forces and brigade staffs for combat. See Chapter II. 
O/C - Observer I Controller. These are soldiers from the NTC's Operations Group that 
work with the training unit to provide feedback, manage the operations, and ensure safety 
during the units' rotations. 
OPORD - Operations Order. This is the five-paragraph plan that commanders issue to 
their subordinates so that they can execute a mission. It includes a description of the 
situation, the mission statement, how the plan will be executed, instructions concerning 
service support, and instructions concerning command and signal. It might also include 
annexes concerning anything special or peculiar to the operation. 
OPFOR - Generic term for the "opposing force", or "bad guys", in force-on-force 
training. An OPFOR will replicate enemy forces so that units can conduct realistic 
training. See Chapter II. 
PCI - Pre-Combat Inspection. See Chapter N, Section A. 
SA WE - Simulated Area Weapons Effects. See Chapter II. 
TAF - Tactical Analysis Facility. Each task force OIC team at the NTC has a TAP from 
which to observe certain aspect of the battle. It monitors all audio signals from the training 
unit. It also has video monitors that show digital icons representing all systems on the 
battlefield. The TAP serves as the focal point for data collection and preparation of the 
task force AARs. 
THP - Take Home Package. The collection of all AAR slides, overhead pictures from 
battles, statistics on battle damage assessment and subjectively evaluated areas, etc., from 
the entire rotation. The OIC teams provide a THP for every battle task force that trains at 
the NTC. 
TOW - Tube launched, Optically sighted, Wire guided missile. This is the Army's 
premier anti-tank missile. It is launched from several platforms, including the Bradley 
Infantry and Cavalry Fighting Vehicles, dismounted tripods, Improved TOW Vehicles, 
and High-Mobility MUltipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). 
WARNORD - Warning Order. See Chapter N, Section A. 
78 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Army Regulation 350-50, Combat Training Center Program (CTC), Headquarters, 
Department of the Army., Washington, D. c., 24 May 1995). 
2. PM 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 
1993. 
3. Benson, Kirk c., "Modeling Data Encapsulation and a Communications Network for 
the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.", Master's Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1997. 
4. Goulette, Dana E., "Training Assessment and Modeling Subjective Data 
Encapsulation for the National Training Center.", Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, 1997. 
5. Olenginski, Stanley J., and Seise, Alan, "Methodology and Design of a Multimedia 
CD-ROM Take Home Package for the National Training Center.", Master's Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1997. 
6. PM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1988. 
7. PM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
Washington, D. c., 1985. 
8. Yamasta, Sergeant First Class. Interview, November 24, 1997, National Training 
Center, Fort Irwin, California. 
9. Larsen, Richard J., and Marx, Morris L., An Introduction to Mathematical Statistics 
and Its Applications, Prentice - Hall, 1986. 
10. Walpole, Ronald E., et al., Probability and Statistics for Engineers and Scientists, 
Prentice - Hall, 1998. 
79 
80 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center ....................................................... 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Ste 0944 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library .................................................................................... 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
3. Professor Harold Larson ....................................................................... 1 
Code ORILa 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
4. Professor Sam Parry ............................................................................ 1 
Code ORIPy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
5. LTC Kenneth Isenberg ......................................................................... 2 
Deputy Chief, Operations Group 
National Training Center 
Fort Irwin, California 92310 
6. MAJ Scott Farquhar ............................................................................ 1 
Center for Army Lessons Learned Representative 
Operations Group 
National Training Center 
Fort Irwin, California 92310 
7. Armor Officer Advanced Course ............................................................. 1 
16th Cavalry Regiment 
Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121 
8. Armor Officer Basic Course ................................................................... 1 
16th Cavalry Regiment 
Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121 
9. Infantry Officer Advanced Course ............................................................ 1 
1 st Battalion, 11 th Infantry Regiment 
Fort Benning, Georgia 31905 
81 
10. Infantry Officer Basic Course .................................................................. 1 
2nd Battalion, 11 th Infantry Regiment 
Fort Benning, Georgia 31905 
11. CPT Steven A. Stoddard ...................................................................... .2 
3730 Falcon Drive 
Bellvue, Nebraska 68123 
82 
